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PRIESTLEY V FOWLER (1837) AND THE
EMERGING TORT OF NEGLIGENCE
MICHAEL ASHLEY STEIN *
Abstract: Priestly v. Fowler has long been noted as the source of the
doctrine of common employment. This Article, however, argues that the
case is better understood in the context of the then-emerging
independent tort of negligence—specifically, as an unsuccessful attempt
to require of masters a duty of care towards their servants. The Article
re-examines the facts, arguments, personalities, and various reported
versions of the case in tracing the effort to establish a new duty of care.
The Article traces, as well, to another case, Hutchinson v. York, the true
origins of the common employment doctrine. Finally, the Article
compares the perspectives of nineteenth century authorities to those of
modern writers hi establishing how Priestly came to be detached from its
true significance.
INTRODUCTION
Although it may fairly be presumed that workmen. have always
been involved in accidents during the course of their employment,
Priestley v. Fowler' is the first known recorded decision of an employee
having sued an employer for work-related injuries. 2 Consequently, the
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' 3 Murph. & H. 305 (Ex. 1837) The decision is reported by four different sources.
The Murphy es' Hurlstone version is the most detailed, offering a brief account of both the
assize trial and the arguments presented to the Court of Exchequer. Accordingly, it will be
utilised exclusively tiniest otherwise noted.
2
 Working from the 1840 diaries of the philanthropic Earl of Shaftsbury, his biogra-
pher recounted that Lord Ashley sponsored two actions by injured employees against their
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case has become familiar to several generations of legal commenta-
tors, most of whom repeat by rote the accepted wisdom that the opin-
ion originates the doctrine of common employment, 3 and censure in
often colourful terms the ideology they deem displayed in Abinger,
C.B.'s ruling.4
Recently, a handful of studies have reassessed the decision within
its historical context. Brian Simpson, for example, demonstrated how
changes in the Poor Law precipitated the litigation.5 Richard Epstein
divined from lack of direct prior precedent the existence of an Iron-
clad rule" precluding employers' liability to their servants for indus-
trial accidents.° In contrast, Terrance Ingman, in a pair of articles,
asserted that the judgment controverted an already established em-
ployers' liability for workplace injuries, while also laying the ground-
work for the defence 'of volenli non fit injuria. 7 Expressing skepticism,
Kostal was unconvinced of the case's significance, deeming it the
"unreliable precedent of an unreliable judge."8 Each of these treat-
masters. All that is known about the first is that the action settled out of court. The second
involved a factory girl named Elizabeth Cottrell who was grievously injured when her dress
was caught on an unfenced shaft. Before Rolfe. B, at the 1840 Liverpool Summer Assizes,
the defendant factory owner Samuel Stocks conceded liability for £100, plus £600 in costs
for the redoubtable advocate (and later Court of Common Pleas judge) Cresswell
Cresswell. See EDWIN HODDER, THE LIFE AND WORK OF HE SEVENTH EARL OF SHAFTSBURY,
K.G. 301, 347 (1866); A.W. BRIAN SIMPSON, LEADING CASES IN '01E COMMON LAW 128
(1995). Variant perceptions on the absence of such cases prior to 1837 are set forth infra in
note 258.
3 A representative list includes formidable legal historians among its members. See. e.g.,
J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 471 (3d ed. 1990) (1971) ("it
was held in 1837 that an employee could not sue his master for the negligence of a fellow
employee"); W.R. CORNISH G. DE N. CLAM LAW AND SOCIETY IN ENGLAND 1750.1950,
at 496-98 (1989); Arthur L, Goodhart, Determining the Ratio Decidendi of a Case, 40
161, 162 (1930) ("In Priestley v. Fonder the famous or infamous doctrine of common em-
ployment was first laid down.").
4 For instance, Friedman and Ladinsky's appraisal that the opinion was "diffuse and
unperceptive," linked to "the onrush of the industrial revolution." Lawrence M. Friedman
& Jack Ladinsky, Social Change and the Law of industrial Accidents, in AMERICAN LAW AND THE
CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER 269, 270 (Lawrence M. Friedman & Harry N. Scheiber eds.,
1978).
5 See SIMPSON. supra note 2, at 100-34.
6 See Richard A. Epstein, The Historical Origins and Economic Structure of Workers' Compen-
sation Law, 16 GA. L. REV. 775, 777 (1982).
7 Terence Ingman, A History of the Defense ofVolen ti Non Fit Injuria, 26 JURID. REV. 1, 8-
9 (1981) [hereinafter Ingman, History]; Terence Ingman, The Rise and Fall of the Doctrine of
Common Employment, 23 JURID. REV. 106, 108-09 (1978) [hereinafter Ingman, Rise and Fall].
See R.W. KOSTAL, LAW AND ENGLISH RAILWAY CAPITALISM 1825-1875, at 268 (1994).
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silents, however, works from the time-honoured premise that Piiestley
was the source of the defence of common employment.
Diverging from conventional scholarship, this Article demon-
strates that. Priestley is better understood within the framework of the
emerging independent tort of negligence as an unsuccessful attempt.
to fashion a duty of care on behalf of masters towards their servants.9
Specifically, it will argue that. Charles Priestley's counsel sought to
emulate the arguments (and hence the success) of two Assize verdicts
that had extended the customary limitations of liability for negligence
earlier that same year: Vaughan. v. Menlovel° and, to a lesser extent,
Langridge v. Levy. 11 The Article will then illustrate how some thirteen
years later, Hutchinson v. York, Newcastle (.9' Berwick Railway Co. 12 (and its
companion decision Wiginore v. Jay)," truly produced the doctrine of
common employment in England. 14
 This is an assessment with which
a plurality of Victorian jurists, as well as the vast majority of contem-
porary treatise writers agreed. Nevertheless, because of the character
of the opinion that Abinger, C.B. had issued in Priestley, a revisionist.
interpretation developed over time and Priestley, rather than
Hutthinson, came to stand for the source of the defence. The Article
concludes by evaluating more recent. reconsiderations of Priestley and
revealing their general inaccuracy.
9
 Unsuccessful in the immediate sense that Charles Priestley's injuries were uncom-
pensated. In a later work, the author will illustrate how nineteenth century English appel-
late court judges laboured assiduously to extend this non-liability for personal injuries to
their servants. At the same time, the narrow window of liability which did (rarely) prevail
may be said to originate in &task".
10 3 Bing. (N.C.) 468, 132 Eng. Rep. 490 (C.?. 1837).
" 2 M. & W. 519, 150 Eng. Rep. 863 (Ex. 1837).
12 5 Ex. 343, 155 Eng. Rep. 150 (1850).
13 5 Ex. 354. 155 Eng. Rep. 155 (1850).
14 In the United States, where the defence is known as the fellow servant rule, its clearest
statement was articulated by Shaw, C.J. in Famed! v. Boston & Worcester Railroad Corp., 45 Mass.
49 (1842), although the principle was first enunciated in Murray v. South Carolina Railroad,
26 S.C.L. (1 Malta.) 385 (1838).
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I. THE CASE OF PRIESTLEY V. FOWLERI5
On May 30, 1835, Charles Priestley," a servant of butcher Tho-
mas Fowler of Market Deeping, was ordered to conduct mutton to
market. The meat was placed in a wagon driven by William Beeton,
another of Fowler's employees." Priestley was to accompany the cart
only as far as Buckden, some twenty miles from Peterborough, where
he was to sell some quantity of the loaded provisions. Beeton would
then continue on to London to vend the remainder.
The four-horse team could not move the van and "jibbed," mean-
ing that they stopped in their tracks and would not move forward.
Turning to the nearby Fowler, Beeton protested that "he ought to be
ashamed of himself for sending such a dangerous load." Fowler re-
sponded by calling Beeton "a damned fool for saying anything of the
sort." Although present during the exchange, Priestley held his
peace." Following this ominous start, the wagon soon embarked on
15
 Following Simpson's lead, this section utilises the following newspaper accounts to
supplement the pre-Court of Exchequer exegesis of the case: BOSTON, LOUTH & SPALDING
HERALD, July 19, 1836; DONCASTER, NOTI1NGHANI & LINCOLN GAZETTE, July 19, 1836;
GAINSBOROUGH, ISLE OF AXHOLME, LOU'Ili & LINDSAY ADVERTISER, July 19, 1836; LIN-
COLN, BOSTON & NEWARK TUESDAY'S GAZETTE, July 19, 1836; LINCOLN. RUTLAND &
STAMFORD MERCURY, July 22, 1836; LINCOLNSHIRE CHRON. & GEN. ADVERTISER, June 5,
1835; LINCOLNSHIRE CHRON. & GEN. AnviEtcusEnJuly 22, 1836; NORTHAMPTON MERCURY,
July 23, 1836. Unless otherwise indicated, the pre-appellate account is drawn collectively
from the above sources.
16
 Two individuals surnamed Priestley had previously litigated related issues. Underhill
v. Priestley (1781) reported a claim against one Thomas Priestley for negligently driving a
loaded cart, while Priestley v. Watson, 3 C. & M. 691, 149 Eng. Rep. 938 (Ex. 1834), re-
Con -tied the suit by a Joseph Priestley challenging Brotherton township's Poor Law assess-
ments against the Aire & Calder Navigation Company. The former opinion may be found
in JAMES °LIMAN', 2 THE MANSFIELD MANUSCRIPTS AND THE GROWTH OF ENGLISH LAW IN
THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 1137 (1992). The latter case was determined in the Court of
Exchequer one term before Lord Abinger was appointed Chief Baron.
17
 None of the accounts make clear who loaded the wagon with the "peds" (i.e., ham-
pers) of mutton.
18
 Diverging from the other four accounts, Murphy & Hurlstone reported that the
"plaintiff remonstrated, on account of the cart being overloaded, and too weak to bear the
load, and it being dangerous to go by it," Priestley, 3 Morph. & H. at 305. Although argu-
ments before the Court of Exchequer would later make heavy weather over Priestley's
acquiescent riding in the van, the discrepancy over the complaint's source is immaterial.
Whether Priestley or Beeton, Priestley either was of the opinion, had confirmed his opin-
ion, or was given notice of Beeton's opinion, that the van was overloaded. Relying on the
Murphy & Hurlstone report, Inginan's account in Rise and Fall was rightly taken to task as
"incorrect" by Simpson. SIMPSON, supra note 2, at 107 n.28; see lngman, Rise and Fall, supra
note 7. Kostal was likewise mistaken. Sec KosTm„ supra note 8, at 260.
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its journey, propelled into motion by some of Fowler's other employ-
ees.°
Nearing Peterborough, Beeton and Priestley heard a cracking
noise as the cart rolled over some stones. Consequently, they had the
van inspected by Gideon Lucas, owner of the King's Head Inn. The
perusal, conducted by lantern light because they had departed Mar-
ket Deeping at nine thirty at night, revealed nothing amiss with the
cart. Nevertheless, while traversing the mile south from Peterborough
towards Norman Cross, the wagon's front axle cracked along a third
of its length and gave way, overturning the vehicle. Beeton was pulled
ahead of the van's collapse by the horses, escaping substantial harm.
Priestley was less fortunate: some four hundredweight worth of mut-
ton fell on him, resulting in a broken thigh, a dislocated shoulder,
and various other injuries.
As was customary upon the occurrence of such accidents, 20
Priestley was taken to the closest. public lodging, in this case the King's
Head Inn from which he and Beeton had recently departed. Lying "in
a very precarious state," Priestley remained at the inn for nineteen
weeks, during the course of which he was treated by two surgeons. Ex-
actly what happened during this convalescence period remains open
to conjecture, but the total cost of Priestley's care and treatment, a
hefty £50, 21 was paid by his father, Brown Priestley. 22
 During the Lin-
coln Summer Assizes of 1836, Charles Priestley (as a minor through
his father) sued his master Fowler for compensation relating to his
accident. 23
On July 18, 1836, the action was tried before Park, J., 24 who by all
accounts was a sound judge, although given to occasional losses of
19 Simpson intimated that the cart might have been loaded by unidentified mutton
suppliers. See SEM PSON, supra note 2, at 103.
20
 This is demonstrated, among other cases, by Tomlinson v. Bewail. 5 B. & C. 738, 108
Eng. Rep. 274 (K.B. 1826). and Lamb o. Bum 4 M. & S. 274, 105 Eng. Rep. 836 (K.B.
1815).
21
 A considerable amount, especially when compared to the annual £80 medical
budget of the parish union that presented the charge to Priestley. See SIMPSON, supra note
2, at 126.
22 See id. at 127. Simpson ventured that "some discreet arrangement" might have been
entered into by Brown Priestley, the innkeeper, and the surgeons. Id.
23
 "The present action was brought to recover the amount of the expenses for which
the father had been put in consequence of this lamentable occurrence." Noicrunturron
MERcuRvJuly 23. 1836.
24
 In relating the events of trial, Kostal inadvertently identified the jurist as Parke, B.
rather than Park, J., possibly because Bartrip and Burman identified the jurist as "Parke, J."
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temper. 25
 Serjeant Edward Goulbourne" and Mr. Nathaniel Clarke 27
represented Priestley, while Serjeant John Adams 28 and Mr. Andrew
Amos29
 acted as counsel for Fowler."
Priestley pleaded two grounds in support of his claim against his
master, a latent defect and the van's overloading. The declaration
stated that when Fowler had "directed" the plaintiff to accompany the
mutton to market "in" the van, Fowler was tinder a duty "to use due
and proper care that said van should be in a proper state of repair"
and "not be overloaded, and that the plaintiff should be safely and
securely carried thereby." As a result of Fowler having breached this
P.WJ. BARTRIP & S.B. BURMAN, THE WOUNDED SOLDIERS OF INDUSTRY 104 (1983); K05-
TAL, supra note 8, at 262, 262 11.45. The error is significant because Park, J. in both the
Priestity assize case and the Court of Common Pleas case of thughan v. Menlove, 3 Bing.
(N.C.) 468, 132 Eng. Rep. 490 (C.P. 1837), fostered master/servant liability. As will be seen
below, Parke, B. took the opposite approach. See infra notes 115-116 and accompanying
text.
25 See E. Foss, A BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF 111E JUDGES OF ENGLAND 1066-1870, at
496-97 (1870) (describing Park, J.'s "only drawback" as "a certain irritability about trifles,
which too frequently excited the jocularity of the bar"); 15 DICEIONARY OF NATIONAL BI-
OGRAPHY 216 (Oxford University Press CD-ROM, version 1.0, 1995) ("[ass a judge, though
not eminent, he was sound, fair, and sensible, a little irascible, but highly esteemed"). A
popular yarn represented Park, J. as the illegitimate son of George III, to whom he bore a
resemblance. See MICHAEL GILBERT, THE OXFORD BOOK OF LEGAL ANECDOTES 234 (1986).
26
 Coronet and Lieutenant in the Royal Horse Guards, and Tory M.P. for Leicester
during the course of Priestley. See 7 DICITONARY OF NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY, SUM note 25, at
283. Simpson mistakenly reported Gotilbourne's legislative career as "M.P. for Ipswich."
SIMPSON, supra note 2, at 102 n.8. Although not egregious, the oversight is relevant, Had
Goulbourne successfully contested representation for Ipswich in 1832, he would have been
a colleague of Sir James Scarlett (later Abinger, C.B.),. who was returned for Norwich in
that same election. See 17 DICTIONARY or NATIONAL. BIOGRAPHY, supra note 25, at 890.
27
 Afterward a county court judge. See SIMPSON, supra note 2, at 102 n.9.
28
 Also the author of a legal text. Seel ADAMS, A TREATISE ON 'DIE PRINCIPLES AND
PRACTICE or 'fliE ACTION OF EJECYMENT AND THE RESULTING ACTION FOR MESNE PROITIS
(2d ed. 1818),
26
 A respected lecturer on jurisprudence, Amos would become the first Professor of
Law at the University of London (later University College), then the Downing Professor at
Cambridge University from 1849 to 1860. Seel DICTIONARY or NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY 366-
67, supra note 25.
50
 No evidence exists of how such expensive legal talent was retained, although Simp-
son surmised that a contingency fee may have been arranged for Priestley. SIMPSON, supra
note 2, at 102. Kostal concurred, adding that "the number of lawyers in towns like Lincoln
was on the rise in this period," thereby "increasing the chance that one of their number
would become interested in Priestley's predicament." Kos .rm., supra note 8, at 261 n.34.
This begs the question of how Fowler, as a defendant unable to proceed under a contin-
gency fee, could have afforded his counsel, and raises the conjecture that those costs con-
tributed to his subsequent bankruptcy. See Priesilcy is Fowler, 3 Murph. & H. 305, 305 (Ex.
1837); LINCOLNSHIRE CITRON. & GEN. ADVERTISER, PD. 24, 1837.
20031	 Priestley v. Fowler C.o.' the Emerging Tort of Negligence	 695
duty, the van had broken down and the plaintiff was harmed. No alle-
gation was made as to negligent actions or omissions, nor of the exis-
tence or violation of a duty towards Charles Priestley by anyone in
Fowler's employ, 31
Throughout the trial, Serjeant Goulbourne emphasised the over-
loading claim, with contrary evidence presented by the parties as to
the weight both properly and actually borne by the wagon. Evidence
was also given as to the extent of the axle's defect prior to the acci-
dent. In putting Priestley's case to the jury, Goulbourne played to
their sympathies, remonstrating the unprincipled behaviour of the
"wealthy butcher" defendant towards the plaintiff who "was one of a
large family'," and asking for not only reimbursement of medical ex-
penses, but. also recompense for Priestley's pain and suffering:
M hat a very opulent tradesman, a man in a very large way
of business like the defendant, should have driven this poor
lad into court, for he would say that not only justice, but also
in common humanity, he ought to pay the pecuniary dam-
ages his client had sustained, and also some remuneration
for the suffering he had undergone, and the deprivation
under which he was now labouring and would labour for the
rest of his days.32
Opposing the claim, Serjeant Adams denied that the cart had
been overloaded, noting that Priestley had continued on the journey
after first witnessing Beeton's protest, and then hearing the cart crack
near Peterborough. Nor could Fowler he held liable, Adams contin-
ued, as he was only bound to use "such ordinary care and diligence as
lie would use over himself," and the defendant had been satisfied as
to the state of his property." In any event, Serjeant Adams asserted
that as a legal matter, Fowler as a master was not liable to his servant
Priestley. This was because there was "no such case in the books,"34
and for good reason: "Rif the defendant was responsible in this case,
every master was liable to any accident that might occur to his servant
about his work?" No evidence reveals the possible negligence of
Priestley's fellow servants ever being raised or at issue during the trial.
81 See Priestley, 3 Nitirph. & H. at 305.'
32
 LINcot,Nsil nu: CITRON. & GEN. ADVER'llSER, July 22, 1836.
33 See id.
34 Id,
35
 LINCOLN, BOSTON & NEWARK TUESDAY'S GAzErn:July 19, 1836.
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Without identifying a related judgment, Park, J. disagreed with
Adams's contention "that there is no such case on the books," and
refused to nonsuit the plaintiff, opining that "the defendant is li-
able."3° At the same time, he pointed out that the jury could consider
Priestley's acquiescence in light of the wagon's condition, and granted
Adams permission to move the full court in Westminster should the
jury enter a verdict against his client. 37
 Next, instructing the jury,
Park, J. stated that Fowler could not be held liable for a hidden defect
in the wagon. Instead
the only question here was,—and it was one of fact—was the
van shamelessly overladen; was it laden unsafely and to a
dangerous degree; and, if so, was the master acquainted with
the fact? ... if the jury were of opinion that the accident was
occasioned by the 'pigheadedness' of the defendant in over-
loading the van they would find for the plaintiff. 38
After deliberating for less than half an hour, the jury awarded Charles
Priestley a sizeable £100. 33
During the following Michaelmas Term of 1836, Serjeant Adams
obtained a rule to arrest the judgment on the ground "that there was
nothing in the declaration to throw any liability on the master."40
 Ad-
ams also moved for a new trial, but this part of the rule was aban-
doned when Fowler became bankrupt.'" As a result, the arguments
" LINCOLNSHIRE CHRON. & GEN. kuvrtertstit, July 22,1836.
37 See id.
" Id.
"Id. Subtracting the medical expenses of £50, Priestley received £50 in damages.
While no evidence exists as to Priestley's yearly wages, it was probably not more than the
few pounds earned annually by domestic servants, thus equating the damages to as many
as ten years' pay. See ANN KUSSMAUL, SERVAN -IS IN HUSBANDRY IN EARLY MODERN ENG-
LAND 35-39 (1981).
40 Priestley, 3 Murph. & H. at 305. In the Law Journal account, Adams moved on the
ground that the declaration did not allege that it was the duty of the plaintiff to go in the
van." See Priestley v. Fowler, 7 L.J. Ex. 43 (1837).
Priestley, 3 Murph. & H. at 305. The latter part of the motion is not addressed by
other law reports.
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presented on January 16, 1837 before the full Court, of Exchequer 42
were confined solely to the motion in arrest ofjudgment. 43
Showing cause, Serjeant Goulbourne began by conceding that a
probable issue" was whether Priestley had been required to ride in
the van, or had been at liberty to walk alongside it, Such concern was
vitiated when the Court of Exchequer intimated the sufficiency of the
declaration on this subject. 45 Next, after acknowledging that the suit
was "a case of the first impression" without "precedent exactly in
point,"46 Goulbourne declared that the action was "maintainable on
general principles of law," 47 analogising Priestley's situation to that of
"an ordinary coach passenger." 48 To this, Abinger, C.B. raised the dis-
tinction that. a coach passenger had no means of knowing the coach's
condition, whereas a servant could make his own inspection. 49 Ser-
jean t. Gottlbourne averred that as in the coach/passenger situation,
the master/servant relationship was contractual. 50 The servant paid
consideration with his labour, and the master was in turn duty bound
"not to expose him to risk in performing these services." 51 Because
42 In addition to Abinger, C.B., were Parke, Rolland. Alderson. and Gurney. B.B. Sec E.
Foss, 9 THE JUDGES OF ENGLAND: WITH SKETCHES OF THEIR LIVES 62 (1864).
45 At this point the four reports diverge in their treatment of counsel's arguments.
Murphy & Hurlstone and Meeson & Welby offer significantly similar and detailed accounts,
the Lary Journal an abbreviated version, and the Jurist !tone at all.
44 Bolstering the Law Journal report that plaintiff's counsel showed cause at an earlier
time. Sec Priestley, 7 L.J. Ex. at 43.
45 Priestley v. Fowler, 3 M. & W 1, 2,150 Eng. Rep. 1030, 1031 (1837).
4° Priestlg, 3 Murph. & H. at 305.
47 Priestley, 3 M. & W. at 2, 150 Eng. Rep. at 1031.
48 Priestley, 3 Murph. & H. at 305-06.
"Moreover,
a master, knowing a room to be infectious, puts a servant to sleep there, and the
servant incurs a disease, the master would be clearly liable; but it would be oth-
erwise if he had put him in a room where the windows were broken, and the
place otherwise so obviously ruinous, as that he himself could actually see its
condition; in the latter case you would hardly say that the master would be li-
able for an injury that resulted to the servant.
Id.
5° The reports are distorted on this point. In Meeson & Welsby and the Law Journal,
C.B. made this contractual analogy while in Murphy & Ilutistone it is raised by
Serjeant Gottlbourne in response to Abinger, C.B.'s query See Priestley. 3 M. & W. at 3, 150
Eng. Rep. at 1031; Priestley, 7 L.J. Ex. at 43; Priestley, 3 Murph. & H. at 306.
51 Priestley, 3 Murph. & H. at 306. Meeson & Welby reported that Goulbourne further ex-
tended the coach/passenger comparison by positing whether recovery would be affected
for a coach passenger who noticed that "the coachman was intoxicated or the horses un-
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the jury had found for the plaintiff, two inferences had to be In-
tended," or drawn. First, that "it was the master's duty to provide a
proper vehicle," and second, "that the master knew the van was over-
loaded."52
Plaintiff's counsel concluded his averments by arguing that even
if brought in assumpsit, the action would have alleged the same basis
for recovery because the law implied a promise "co-extensive" to the
violations of duty alleged under case in the declaration. In response,
the Chief Baron opined that liability would exist in those circum-
stances if either the master had "maliciously designed" to injure his
servant, or he had "positively guaranteed" his safety. Seizing upon this
opening, Serjeant Goulbourne stated that after the verdict "it will be
intended that the master was aware of the danger, and that lie denied
to the servant that there was any danger."53
 Parke, B. then posed a hy-
pothetical: "Suppose I send my servant on the roof, to clear away the
snow; if the roof gives way am I liable?" Serjeant Goulbourne replied
that the present case differed because "it is not a mere state of insuffi-
ciency; for the overloading of the cart is a positive act, which occa-
sions the accident."54
 At no point during the repartee did either Ser-
jeant Goulbourne or the Exchequer Barons touch on the likelihood
of Priestley's injury originating from the oversight of a fellow servant.
In arrest of the judgment, Serjeant Adams contended that the
plaintiff had improperly framed his action in case rather than in as-
sumpsit. 55
 This error was dispositive, for in order to maintain an ac-
tion, five circumstances had to exist:
ruly." Parke, B. responded that tinder those circumstances the duty to carry the passenger
safely would only extend as far as the conditions known to the passenger, i.e., that of a
drunken driver with a rambunctious horse. Abinger, C.B. added that a "stage-coachman"
who knowingly drove a recalcitrant horse would also be barred from recovery. Priestley, 3
M. & W. at 3, 150 Eng. Rep. at 1031.
52 Sec Priestley, 3 Murph. & H. at 306. Meeson & Wdby offered a different version
wherein Goulbourne admitted that "Mt does not appear on the face of the declaration,
that the plaintiff knew the van was overloaded, and it cannot be intended after verdict: on
the other hand, it does not appear that the defendant knew it." Priestley, 3 M. & W. at 3, 150
Eng. Rep. at 1031. Relying upon this report of the case, Haines castigated Goulbourne for
sloppy lawyering. See B.W. Haines, English Labour Law and the Separation From Contract, 1 1
LEGAL HIST. 262, 284 (1980). Using the Murphy Co' Hurlstone version, Kostal agreed. Sec
KOSTAL, supra note 8, at 262.
65
 Priestley, 3 Murph. & H. at 305.
64 id.
65
 Because the action alleged was "in the nature of a contract." it should have been
brought in assumpsit. Instead, the plaintiff had sought relief in case, which as a tort re-
quired common-law liability to exist between master and servant. Id.
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First, that the van was overloaded, by defendant's order. Sec-
ond, that plaintiff was ignorant of its being overloaded.
Third, there must be an order by the defendant, to plaintiff,
to go on the van. Fourth, that it was necessary for the plain-
tiff to do so, in order to perform his duty in respect of the
goods. And, fifth, that the order shall be a lawful command
which the servant is hound to obey. 55
The action having raised three of Adams's prerequisites to liabil-
ity, the Barons of the Exchequer engaged defendant's counsel in a
protracted discussion of whether Priestley was required to ride in the
wagon or could have walked alongside it, then intended that the dec-
laration was sufficient on this point. 57 Serjeant Adams concluded his
advocacy by proclaiming that "there is nothing in the declaration
which shews that this was anything more than a mere accident; and
for a mere accident which happens in a master's service, the master is
not responsible."58 As with the arguments presented by his opposing
counsel, Adams never raised the prospect of vitiating his client's liabil-
ity, due to the intervening act of a fellow servant.
Instead of rendering a decision on the day of argument, the
Court of Exchequer reserved judgment, presenting its opinion on
November 23, 1837.59 For the Court, 69 Abinger, C.B. delivered a ram-
bling opinion arresting the judgment.° 1 The Chief Baron began by
dismissing as a matter of law the assertion that. Fowler's knowledge of
overloading could be intended after verdict.°2 The only issue to be
decided was both narrow and clear: whether "the mere relation of
56 Id. at 305-07.
57 That Serjeant Adams raised this issue after the Court of Exchequer had already dis-
posed of it during Serjeant Goulbourne's appeal lends additional support to the Law Jour.
nal report that Goulbourne had spoken on a previous occasion. See Priestley, 7 Li. Ex. at 43.
58
59
 The ten month delay, according to Simpson, "suggests some difficulty in achieving
unanimity." SIMPSON, supra note 2, at 107; see also LINCOLN, RUTLAND & STAMFORD MER-
CURY, Jan. 20,1837 ("[t] he Court would take time to look into the case, as it was a nice
one, and involved some important consequences").
6°
 Whose constituency had not been altered in the interval. Foss, supra note 42, at 62.
61 With one minor exception, the opinion is related verbatim in all the reported ver-
510115.
62 1n so doing, Abinger, C.B. "was not evaluating evidence, but determining as a matter
of law whether knowledge could be 'intended' after verdict." SimrsoN, supra note 2, at 107
n.28. Rasta] and Ingman nevertheless took Abinger, C.B. to task for ignoring evidence
submitted at trial. See KOSTA1„ supra note 8, at 263; Ingman, Rise and Fall, supra note 7, at
108-09.
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master and servant" implied a common-law duty "on the part of the
master, to cause the servant to be safely and securely carried." Lacking
"precedent for the present action," the Court was at "liberty to look at
the consequences of a decision the one way or the other."63
Deciding "the question upon general principles," Abinger, C.B.
cautioned that if legal culpability was upheld under these circum-
stances "the principle of that liability will be found to carry us to an
alarming extent?" He then put forward a number of examples in
dicta illustrating the magnitude to which such a rule would cause
principals to be responsible to their "inferior agents":
If the owner of the carriage, therefore, is responsible for the
sufficiency of his carriage to his servant, he is responsible for
the negligence of his coach-maker, or his harness-maker, or
his coachman. The footman, therefore, who stands behind
the carriage, may have an action against his master for a de-
fect in the carriage, owing to the negligence of the coach-
maker, or for a defect in the harness arising from the negli-
gence of the harness-maker, or for the drunkenness, neglect,
or want of skill in the coachman.°
Even more distressing to Lord Abinger was that the rationale of the
case could be broadened further, allowing, for example, a master to
"be liable to the servant, for the negligence of the chambermaid, in
putting him into a damp bed."" In other words, Abinger, C.B. clearly
foresaw that permitting Priestley to recover directly against his master
in this novel action would open the floodgates to vicarious liability,
entitling servants injured by their peers to recover against their com-
mon masters. Because the consequences of such an extension would
63 Priestley, 3 Murph. & H. at 307.
64 Id. at 308.
65 Id.
66
 In addition. Abinger, C.B. anticipated that
[t]he master would also be liable for the acts of the upholsterer for sending in a
crazy bedstead, whereby the servant was made to fall down, while asleep, and in-
jure hithself; for the negligence of the cook in not properly cleansing the cop-
per vessels used in the kitchen; of the butcher in supplying the family with meat
of a quality injurious to health; of the builder for a defect in the foundation of
the house, whereby it fell and injured both the master and servant in ruins.
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engender both "inconvenience" and "absurdity," general principles
provided "a sufficient argument" against liability.67
Acknowledging that the master/servant relationship bound the
master directly to "provide for the safety of his servant ... to the best
of his judgment, information, and belief," the Chief Baron empha-
sised that it. could "never" imply an obligation for the master "to take
more care of the servant than he may reasonably he expected to do of
himself." At the same time, the servant was "not bound to risk his
safety in the service of his master" and was free to "decline any service
in which he reasonably apprehended] injury to himself,"" This was
because servants were in as good, if not better positions, than their
masters to appreciate possible hazards.°
Lord Abinger concluded with a last policy argument against up-
holding the jury's verdict. Allowing this action "would be an encour-
agement to the servant to omit that diligence and caution which he is
in duty bound to exercise on behalf of his master," and which offers
much better protection against injuries "than any recourse against his
master for damages could possibly afford." 7°
II. PRIESTLEY v. FOWLER, NEGLIGENCE, AND COMMON EMPLOYMENT
A. The History of Negligetice Before Priestley v. Fowler
In a series of articles published over the decade 1926-35, Percy
Winfield traced the history of negligence both as an independent tort
67 Id.
• 68 Priestley, 3 Morph. & H. at 307. In the Law Journal report. Abinger, C.B. cited the ir-
relevant case of Levinson u Kirk, 1 Lane 65, 145 Eng. Rep. 303 (Ex. 1610), a suit by a mer-
chant against a servant for not paying customs duty on his consignment of goods. Priestley,
7 Lj. Ex. at 43.
69 See Priestley, 3 Murph, & H. at 308. Thus "the plaintiff must have known, as well as his
master, and probably better, whether the van was sufficient, whether it was overloaded, and
whether it was likely to carry him safely." Id. Haines explained this passage by stating that
the reasoning of the court seems to be that the master was not liable because,
had he got into the van instead of his servant he could not have brought an
action, as it was possible for him to see the van was overloaded and therefore
the servant could have seen it also, and both could have refused to ride.
Haines, supra note 52, at 282. More accurately, the Court of Exchequer meant that (1)
even if Fowler did not agree with his judgment, Priestley did not have to ride in the van if
he thought it overloaded, and (2) when Priestley (and of course, not Fowler) heard the
axle crack near Peterborough, he should not have continued riding.
70 Priestley. 3 Murph. & H. at 308.
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and as a mode of committing a tort. 71 Acknowledging that liability for
inadvertence had existed in cases from the time of the Year Books,"
he set the temporal boundary for the rise of negligence as a separate
tort at the point when three ingredients had been present: (1) a legal
duty by the defendant towards the plaintiff; (2) a breach of that duty
by either inadvertence or insufficiently advertent conduct; and (3)
the plaintiff sustaining harm as a consequence of the defendant's
breach of duty." Winfield concluded that although all three theories
necessary for a separate doctrine were present prior to the second
quarter of the nineteenth century," they were not yet distinctly enu-
merated as principles." Then, because industrial machinery, and in
particular railways, "killed any object from a Minister of State to a
wandering cow," negligence evolved from having been only a method
through which various torts were committed into "an independent
tort which sprang from the action upon the case."76
Prior to industrialisation, Winfield explained, inadvertent injury
gave rise to civil liability for the violation of five distinct types of duty.
These duties emanated from: (1) a public calling such as an inn-
keeper, common carrier, surgeon or farrier; (2) a public office, most
commonly a sheriff; (3) a bailment; (4) a prescription or custom,
such as omitting to provide beer for the beadle of a hundred; and (5)
the control of dangerous things, such as unruly animals or fire. 77 With
the exception of the last category, which was grounded in a "custom
of the realm," these duties involved an undertaking which equated
the individual's status with his attendant obligations."
According to Winfield, performing an act defined by specific
status—for example shoeing a horse—pre-supposed a proper use of
71 See generally Percy H. Winfield, Duty in Tothous Negligence, 34 Comm. L. REV. 41
(1934) [hereinafter Winfield, Duty]; Percy H. Winfield, The History of Negligence in the Law of
Tort, 42 L.Q. REV. 184, 195 (1926) [hereinafter Winfield, History]; Percy H. Winfield, Law of
Tort, 51 L.Q. REV. 249 (1935); Percy H. Winfield, The Myth of Absolute Liability, 42 L.Q. REV.
37 (1926) [hereinafter Winfield, Myth]; Percy H. Winfield, Nuisance as a Tort, 4 CAM BR EDGE
L.J. 13 (1931); Percy H. Winfield & Arthur L. Goodhart, Trespass and Negligence, 49 L.Q.
REV. 359 (1933); see also PERcv H. WINFIELD, PROVINCE 01 'FRE LAW OF TORT (1931 ).
72
 Sec generally Winfield, Myth, supra note 71; Winfield & Goodhart, supra note 71.
78
 See generally Winfield, Duty, supra note 71.
74 To fix dates is to invite instant criticism, but we are not far out if we select the pe-
riod from about 1825 onwards as the most fruitful." Winfield, History, supra note 71, at 195.
75 Sec id. at 185.
78 Sec id. at 195, 185; Winfield, Duty, supra note 71, at 41,
77 See Winfield, Duty, supra note 71, at 44-48.
78 See id.
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care. When injury resulted, it gave rise to liability regardless of intent.
Whether the farrier was imprudent or sadistic was irrelevant: the
point was that the plaintiff had taken his horse to the blacksmith and
that its shoe was improperly fitted. Winfield therefore maintained that
prior to the nineteenth century, negligence was almost never men-
tioned, although "the idea of it is implied." 79
C.H.S. Fifoot, 8° Mj. Prichard,81 and J.H. Baker82 have each in
turn demonstrated the understated nature of Winfield's description
of pre-nineteenth century negligence as a "skein of threads" yielding
"little more than a bundle of frayed ends."88 Instead, each successively
traced distinct trends in negligence liability back to the fourteenth
century.
Fifoot asserted that the "prime factor" in the transformation of
negligence into an independent tort was "the luxuriant crop of 'run-
ning-down' actions" created by the economic prosperity of the late
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. 84 Thus, instead of the in-
dustrial machinery of the second quarter of the nineteenth century, it
was the road machinery of the preceding fifty years that "multiplied
accidents and fertilised litigation," propelling forward the doctrine of
negligence. 85
Prichard moved Fifoot's chronology forward by asserting that a
"thin trickle" of running-clown actions from the late seventeenth cen-
tury "should be regarded as the beginnings of the tort of negli-
gence."86 Examining these suits, Prichard maintained that plaintiffs
brought their actions in case, alleging a form of negligence in the at-
78 See id. at 44-45,
80 See C.H.S. FIFOOT, HISTORY AND SOURCES OF THE COMMON LAW: TORT AND CON-
TRACT 154-66 (1949) (hereinafter FIFOOT, HISTORY AND SOURCES]; C.H.S. FIFOOTJUDGE
AND JURIST IN THE REIGN OF VICTORIA 31-56 (1959) [hereinafter FIEODT, JUDGE AND JU-
RIST].
84 NU, PRICHARD, SCOTT V, SHEPHERD (1773) AND THE EMERGENCE OF THE TORT OF
NEGLIGENCE (1976) [hereinafter PRICHARD, SCOTT v. SHEPHERD]; M.J. Prichard, Trespass,
Case and the Rule in Williams v. Holland, 1964 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 234 (hereinafter Prichard,
Trespass].
82 See BAKER, SUpra note 3, at 465; J.H. Baker, Introduction to 11 THE REPORTS OF SIR
JOHN SPELMAN (J.H. Baker ed., 1977), in 94 SELDEN SOG'Y 23,224-30 (1977).
as Winfield, History, supra note 71, at 185.
84 See FIFOOT, HISTORY AND SOURCES, supra note 80, at 164.
88 See FIFOOT, JUDGE AND JURIST, supra note 80, at 32. Curiously, Fifoot did not discuss
running-down cases in his writings. Instead, Govett v. Radnidge, 3 East. 62,102 Eng. Rep.
520 (KB. 1802), a negligence action for carelessly loading a hogshead of treacle, is dis-
cussed in both works.
513 See Prichard, Trespass, supra note 81, at 235,
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tendant cum clauses due to two procedural reasons. First, plaintiffs
were unable to join trespass and case actions because the first were
considered appropriate for claims of directly caused harm, the latter
for consequentially engendered injury. Second, pleading trespass en-
gendered a significant risk for defendants to avoid liability by averring
that although the injury was direct, their servants' driving caused it. 87
Last, Prichard demonstrated that a likely origin of negligence is the
1676 case of Mitchil v. Alestree, 88
 which describes the defendant's liabil-
ity as arising out of his servants' carelessness. 89
Finally, Baker established how Mitchi/ "was only a significant step
to later eyes" because traces of negligence as an independent tort can
be seen as far back as the thirteenth century." Among the better
known pre-seventeenth century cases that Baker refers to in support
of this proposition is the fifteenth century "Case of the Thorns,"91
most often referred to in modern textbooks for the proposition of
strict liability Contrary to this commonly held misconception, the
now-discovered record reveals that the action "as pleaded went only to
intention; and the remarks of the judges in rejecting it do not assume
strict liability."92
 Accordingly, lack of intention, and thus non-
negligent behaviour, was clearly offered and recognised as a defence
as early as the fifteenth century.
This most recent treatment, by Baker, harmonises the prior stud-
ies by explaining that the sparsity of pre-nineteenth century negli-
gence actions is attributable to the governing procedural forms of ac-
tion." Specifically, if a plaintiff was injured by an intentional harm he
would sue in trespass. If the harm was non-forcible, then assumpsit
was available when a prior relationship between the parties caused the
injury, for example, if the defendant was a common carrier. Barring
e7 Id. at 241.
89 1 Vent. 295, 2 Lev. 172, 3 Keb. 650 (1676).
ag Prichard, Trespass, supra note 81, at 234-38. Pritchard's "thin trickle" thesis is con-
finned by the presence of a number of "negligence-between-strangers" cases at nisi prigs
before Lord Mansfield. See OLDHAM, supra note 16, at 1119-21.
90 BAKER, supra note 3, at 457 (citing thirteenth century Plea Roll cases).
91
 Hulle Orynge, Mich. 6 Edw. IV, fo. 7, pl. 18 (1466); BAKER, supra note 3, at 457.
92
 BAKER, supra note 3, at 457.
95 Id. at 461-64; see FRANCIS BULLER, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW RELATIVE TO
TRIALS AT NISI PRIUS 35-37 (1768) (delineating the proper procedural method for fram-
ing pleadings in accident cases). The explanation may originate, as do many other insight-
ful ones, with the venerable S.F.C. Milsom. See S.F.C. MILSOM, HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS
or THE COMMON LAW 283-313 (2c1 ed. 1981).
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such a relationship, the plaintiff could only sue in case because of the
indirect nature of the injury.
Until the late eighteenth century these type of harms were usu-
ally caused by fire or dangerous animals, and each in turn was gov-
erned by its own procedural forms. As a result, the number of cases
specifically asserting negligence was reduced to a small handful, lead-
ing "legal historians to the conclusion that negligence could not have
been actionable per se."94 In addition, if defendants did manage to
raise the issue of fault, they did so before a jury after having first
pleaded the general issue of "not guilty." Due to defendants' explana-
tions not usually being recorded, the extent of pleading an absence of
negligence as a defence prior to the late eighteenth century is not
clearly known."
Despite reservations over the extent of the existence of an inde-
pendent tort of negligence prior to the nineteenth century," these
scholars do not take exception to Winfield's theory that a general
duty of care extending to individuals not in pre-existing relationships
did not arise until the second quarter of the nineteenth century. Spe-
cifically, Winfield avowed that "the year 1837 marked a turning
point"7 with the cases of Vaughan v. Menlovcos and Langlidge v. Levy.99
Building upon principles set forth in these decisions, Winfield culti-
vated a "contract fallacy" theoryl" under which negligence-based dit-
ties of care evolved as an alternative to extending already recognised
94 BAKER, supra note 3, at 462.
95 Sec id. at 456.
96 Although cautioning that more evidence is necessary to support this view, Simpson
is "inclined" towards the "hypothesis" that "what happened in the nineteenth century was
not the substitution of new law for old law, but the creation of law where there had been
none before." A.W.B. Simpson. Legal Liability for Bursting Reservoirs: The Historical Context of
Rylands v. Fletcher, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 209, 215 (1984). Simpson has subsequently hypothe-
sised that the dearth of case law prior to the nineteenth century resulted from the stan-
dards of liability having been left to juries. Specifically, that defendants would plead the
general issue (meaning, "not guilty") and then give their stories in evidence. In this cir-
cumstance, there is virtually no information on what judges said to juries. Correspondence
on file with author.
97 See Winfield, Duty, supra note 70, at 54, 51.
99 3 Bing. (N.C.) 468, 132 Eng. Rep. 490 (C.P. 1837).
9t 2 M. & W. 519, 150 Eng. Rep. 863 (Ex. 1837).
10° This term was coined by Prichard. See PRicimitn, Scum. v. SHEPHERD, supra. note
81, at 30.
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liabilities arising from either the five pre-industrial type duties or indi-
vidual contractual agreements."
In Vaughan v. Menlove,Re the plaintiff sued his neighbour at nisi
prius for damages arising from "wrongfully, negligently, and improp-
erly" keeping a haystack in contravention of his "duty." 10
 After the
defendant pleaded not guilty, Patteson, J. instructed the jury to con-
sider whether the fire had been occasioned by the defendant's gross
negligence. He also instructed the jury to bear in mind that the de-
fendant "was bound to proceed with such reasonable caution as a
prudent man would have exercised under such circumstances."104 A
£5 verdict was entered for the plaintiff. Soon thereafter the defendant
obtained a rule nisi for a new trial on the ground that the jury should
have been directed to consider whether the defendant had acted to
the best of his judgment, rather than whether he had been grossly
negligent with reference to an uncertain standard of ordinary pru-
dence. 105
 After noting that this was a case of first impression, the
Court of Common Pleas, through Tindal, C.J., upheld the trial court
upon the long-lived and sweeping principle that everyone has a duty
to use their land so as not to injure others."' Concurring in a separate
opinion, Park, J. reasoned that lapthough the facts in this case are
new in specie, they fall within a principle long established." 07
1 ° 1 See Winfield, Duty, supra note 70, at 54. See generally C.C. ADD/SON, WRONGS AND
THEIR REMEDIES, BEING A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS 5 (1860); C. COLLETT, A MAN-
UAL OF THE LAW OF TORTS, AND OF THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES 6-13 (2d ed. 1866).
3 Bing. at 468, 132 Eng. Rep. at 490.
I" The haystack or "hay-rick" was constructed on the defendant's side of the boundary
between the parties' land, in close proximity to the plaintiff's cottages. When the hay spon-
taneously ignited, the plaintiff's buildings caught fire and were burned down. Sec id.
'" Vaughan, 3 Bing. at 471, 132 Eng. Rep. at 492. This direction was the first annuncia-
tion of the objective, or "reasonable man" standard in negligence actions. See SImesoN,
supra note 2, at 108. In the nisi pries report. Patteson, J.'s jury instructions are given as
follows:
You will say whether the flefendant has acted as a man of ordinary skill and
prudence would have acted, or whether through his negligence and careless-
ness the plaintiff's property has been consumed.... if you think that by his in-
judicious want of care the injury has been occasioned, he is liable in this action.
7 Car. Sc P. 525, 173 Eng. Rep. 232 (1836).
105 Thughan, 3 Bing. at 468, 132 Eng. Rep. at 490-91.
106 ,rd.
1°7 Id.
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In Langridge v. Leuy. 108 the defendant gun merchant sold a rifle to
plaintiffs father, knowingly misrepresenting that the respected
craftsman Nock had made it for the late King George IV. Subse-
quently, the younger Langridge used the gun, which exploded, caus-
ing him injury. An action in case was brought before Alderson, B. at.
the 1836 Somersetshire Summer Assizes, the declaration alleging that
"the defendant was guilty of great breach of duty," violation of war-
ranty, and knowing deceit. 1119 Baron Alderson left the jury to decide
on the existence, breach, and possible scienter of the warranty, but
did not charge them as to the possible violation of a duty of care. 11 °
Consequently, the jury found a £400 general verdict for the plaintiff.
In Michaelmas Term, 1836, Levy's counsel obtained a rule nisi for ar-
resting the judgment on the grounds that an action on the case was
inappropriate where the parties lacked privity of contract, and that in
any event "no duty could result out of a mere private contract, the de-
fendant being clothed with no official or professional character out of
which a known duty could arise."
The motion to arrest judgment was argued before the Court of
Exchequer in Hilary Term, 1837. Plaintiffs counsel showed cause by
contending that actions on the case were "peculiarly applicable" to
circumstances where harm arose from a contractual breach upon
which the injured party could not directly sue. 112 This was because
even in the absence of privily between the parties, the law "imposes" a
chity upon an individual furnishing "that which by his misconduct may
become dangerous to another" to take "reasonable care" that the arti-
cle not cause injury." 5 When a breach of this duty of reasonable care
caused harm, the plaintiff could site upon either the duty arising out
of the contract, or the one imposed by law. Hence "the present case
may be rested on both these grounds." 1 "
Discharging the rule in arrest of judgment, the Court of Excheq-
uer held that lack of privity most assuredly prevented the plaintiff
108 2 M. & W. at 519, 150 Eng. Rep. at 863.
109 Id.
Langridge, 2 M. & W. at 521, 150 Eng. Rep. at 864.
111 Langridge, 2 M. & W. at 521-22, 150 Eng. Rep. at 864.
112 Langridge, 2 M. & W. at 522, 150 Eng. Rep. at 865.
112 In so arguing, counsel was presumably referring to Dixon v. Bell, 1 Stark. 287 (1816),
wherein an action was sustained against a defendant who had entrusted his loaded gun to
a servant who then accidentally shot plaintiff's son. Langridge, 2 M. & W. at 524-25, 150
Eng. Rep. at 866.
114 Langridge, 2 M. & W. at 522, 526, 150 Eng. Rep. at 865.
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from recovering directly upon the contract. Nonetheless, Parke, B.
ruled that an implied duty arose from the affirmative act of falsely
misrepresenting the gun's safety. By doing so, the defendant had cre-
ated a dangerous situation—and thus a duty—where none had previ-
ously existed. 115
 Parke, B., however, explicitly rejected the broad prin-
ciple of duty suggested by plaintiff's counsel:
We are not prepared to rest the case upon one of the
grounds on which the learned counsel for the plaintiff
sought to support his right of action, namely, that wherever a
duty is imposed on a person by contract or otherwise, and
that duty is violated, any one who is injured by the violation
of it may have a remedy against the wrong-doer: we think
this action may be supported without laying down a princi-
ple which would lead to that indefinite extent of liability ...
and we should pause before we made a precedent by our de-
c ision." 5
Thus, although approving liability within the narrow context of a de-
fendant having knowingly created a danger, the Court of Exchequer
explicitly rejected any broader expansion of a general duty of care.
B. Priestley V. Fowler as a Negligence Action
The judicial decision in Priestley is best understood within the cir-
cumstances of the emerging independent tort of negligence as a
failed attempt to create a duty of care on behalf of masters towards
their servants.
To begin with, the only viable claim available to Charles Priestley
was a suit in negligence, whether against Fowler directly or vicariously
through a fellow employee. This was because as a pauper casually in-
jured in Peterborough, Priestley had no recourse against his pre-
sinned parish of settlement, Market Deeping." 7
 At the same time, hav-
ing undertaken payment of his son's medical bills "voluntarily"
(meaning, without either a promise of repayment from an overseer or
approval of such expenses by the medical union's Board of Gover-
nors), Brown Priestley lacked grounds for legal redress against the
115
 Langridge, 2 M. & W. at 529, 532, 150 Eng. Rep. at 867-68.
116 Langridge, 2 M. & W. at 530, 150 Eng. Rep. at 868. The Exchequer Chamber af-
firmed "on the ground stated by Parke, B." Langridge v. Levi; 4 M. & W. 337, 338-39, 150
Eng. Rep. 1458, 1459 (Ex. 1838).
117 SCC SCSI PSON, supra note 2, at 123-27.
20031	 Priestley v. Fowler & the Emerging Tort of Negligence 	 709
Peterborough overseers. 118
 Thé same could be said for the younger
Priestley if he had paid the bill himself with funds borrowed from his
father. Nor was redress available from Fowler through the established
master/servant relationship, for this did not encompass a right to
medical attendance in the absence of an express agreement." 9 Con-
sequently, suing Fowler in negligence offered the Priestleys their only
hope for recompense.
The most closely analogous method for recovering in negligence
was to assert that the master/servant relationship was similar to one of
the established pre-industrial undertakings in which duty bound the
parties' actions. 120
 Because Priestley was hurt while riding on a van,
Serjeant Goulbourne likened his position to that of a passenger con-
veyed by a common carrier, a stagecoach. This assertion was alleged
successfully in the declaration and at trial, but was rebuffed at oral
argument by Abinger, C.B. 121
 A related avenue for recovery in negli-
gence was through a contractual relationship, and so Goulbourne put
a clever spill on Abinger, C.B.'s rebuke, trying to establish a contrac-
tual connection in the master/servant relationship equivalent to that
of a coach and passenger. 122
 Combined, these contentions explain
why Abinger, C.B.'s opinion began with a rejection of an obligation
arising from both the "mere relation of master and servant" as well as
from "contract:425
A second method of founding responsibility for negligence was
to claim that a general duty of care extended from Fowler to Priestley,
a notion inaugurated earlier that same year by the Court of Common
Pleas in Vaughan. 124
 Although no explicit proof links the two cases, a
good deal of inference suggests that their convergence was hardly co-
incidental. 129 Sitting on the Vaughan court was Park, J., who had tried
118
119 Other reasons are set out infra note 157.
129 It is instructive th .at in prefacing his arguments Goulbourne stated that "there is no
precedent exactly in point," while Abinger, C.B.'s opinion was absolute in insisting that
"there is not precedent for the present action." Priestley v. Fowler, 3 Murph. Sc H. 305,
306-07 (Ex. 1837).
121 See id. at 305-06.
122
 Thus, he concluded that if brought in assumpsit the law would have implied a
promise "co-extensive" to the violations of duty alleged under case in the declaration. Id. at
306.
123 Id. at 307.
124 See 3 Bing. at 474-76, 132 Eng. Rep. at 493.
125 Cf. SIMPSON, supra note 2, at 108 (referring to the concurrence as "odd").
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Priestley's assize case. Recognising a member of the Bench sympa-
thetic to extending liability, it would have been in Goulbourne's best
interests to hear the arguments presented in the case. Coupling the
fact that the arguments in Vaughan were conducted only days before
those of Adams in Priestley, with the plausible Law Journal report that
Goulbourne had shown cause at an earlier time than his adversary, it
seems conceivable that he had taken the opportunity to observe the
arguments for the rule nisi in Common Pleas. At the very least, it
would not have been difficult for a well-connected Serjeant at Law to
receive information about the case."°
More significant are the implicit references in Priestlg to Vaughan.
For example, Goulbourne's declaration that in the absence of prece-
dent Priestley's suit "was maintainable on general principles of law," 127
might have been influenced by the Court of Common Pleas's uphold-
ing liability in its own case of first impression because, in Park, J.'s
words, "Although the facts in this case are new in specie, they fall
within a principle long established."128 Moreover, Abinger, C.B.'s
ing in Priestley that the standard of any master's duty of care was purely
subjective "to the best of his judgment, information, and belief," 129
seems a direct rebuttal to the objective standard issued in Vaughan of
"using such reasonable caution as a prudent man would have exer-
cised under such circumstances.""°
Finally, three reasons may explain why no citations to Vaughan
appear in Priestley. First, although arguments in Vaughan were con-
ducted prior to those in Priestley, the decision was not delivered until a
week afterwards. Consequently, Goulbourne may have been reluctant
to cite a case whose ultimate disposition was uncertain. Second, even
if he knew the result, Goulbourne may not have wanted to rely on a
judgment involving Park, J. before the Court of Exchequer owing to
possible animosity against the assize verdict. Third, while it seems cer-
tain that in the ten months they reserved opinion in Priestley the Bar-
ons of the Exchequer became aware of Vaughan, judicial rivalry may
have prevented them from acknowledging the existence of a conflict-
ing opinion that they were powerless to overrule.
128 How frequently advocates relied upon word-of-mouth remains open to conjecture.
It bears reminding, however, that the reports would not have been published until well
after the Chief Baron had delivered his opinion in Priestley.
127 Priestley, Murph. & H. at 305.
128 liaughan, 3 Bing. at 476, 132 Eng. Rep. at 493.
129
 Priestley, 3 Murph. & H. at 308.
13° Vaugltan, 3 Bing. at 475, 132 Eng. Rep. at 493.
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The most novel way of affixing a duty of care on Fowler was to
allege that it was implied by law even in the absence of a pre-existing
relationship or of privity of contract. This theory also made its debut
that same year, in Lanni dge. 131 As with I tau ghan, it seems more than
fortuitous that the principles presented both by Serjeant Goulbourne
and by the Barons of the Exchequer in Priestley were intertwined with
those of Langridge. The motion arresting judgment in Langridge was
argued before the Court of Exchequer only clays prior to its parallel in
Priestley. Again, if not physically present, it was likely that Goulbourne
procured intelligence regarding the case. As an advocate who would
soon appear before the same court to argue a similar motion, he
would have been foolish to ignore that opportunity.
Goulbourne's arguments before the Court of Exchequer confirm
this hypothesis. Goulbourne argued that his client could maintain an
action in either assumpsit or case because the law implied "co-
extensive" duties, 132 emulating the statement by plaintiffs counsel in
Langridge that "the present case may be rested on both these
grounds."'" Priestley's counsel also averred that after verdict it had to
be intended that Fowler had known of the van's overloading, thus
creating a dangerous situation for which he was liable. 13" This was pat-
terned after the argument in Langridge that the law "imposes" a duty
upon an individual furnishing "that which by his misconduct may be-
come dangerous to another" to take "reasonable care" that the article
should not cause injury. 135
The Langridge decision was rendered in April; Priestley necessi-
tated an additional seven months before making its appearance.
Abinger, C.B., Alderson, B., and Parke, B., each sat the bench for both
cases. The Chief Baron rendered the Priestley decision, Alderson
charged the assize jury in Langridge, and Parke, B. rendered the opin-
ion on appeal. They were certain to have discussed these cases, and in
the ten month period intervening argument and decision, Parke, B.
had more than ample opportunity to justify the reputation that he
"exercised a potent, if not preponderant, influence" on the Excheq-
131 2 Murph. & H. at 519. 150 Eng, Rep. at 867-68.
132 Priestley, 3 Murph. & H. at 306.
133 2 M. & NV. at 523. 150 Eng. Rep. at 865.
134 Priestley. 3 Murph. & H. at 306.
193 2 M. & W. at 525. 150 Eng. Rep. at 866.
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uer, 136
 particularly over the substantive area of employers' vicarious
Parke, B.'s sway manifested itself in both Exchequer opinions.
During Goulbourne's January argument in Priestley, Abinger, C.B.
opined that liability existed when a master either knowingly exposed
his servant to an existing risk or, in the absence of knowledge, "posi-
tively guaranteed" his safety.'" Parke, B.'s April Langridge decision ex-
plicitly rejected broad principles of duty, upholding recovery on the
narrow ground that because the defendant had created a dangerous
situation, he was duty bound not to cause the plaintiff harm.'" In No-
vember, Abinger, C.B.'s Priestley opinion began by dismissing the asser-
tion that Fowler's knowledge of overloading could be intended after
verdict, but was silent as to whether Fowler's having commanded
Priestley to ride in the van after Beeton's remonstrance implied a
guarantee. 14°
The absence of citations to Langridge in Priestley is not surprising.
Goulbourne, as before, would not have wanted to found his argu-
ments on an appellate decision of uncertain result, much less so an
assize verdict in which Alderson, B. nonsuited the plaintiff while tak-
ing great care to avoid sanctioning the creation of a novel liability
theory. Moreover, after Parke, B. had so vehemently denied plaintiffs
liability theory in Langridge, the Court of Exchequer certainly would
not have wanted to dignify it by reference.
Therefore, as demonstrated both by the arguments presented
before the Court of Exchequer as well as the grounds of its decision,
Priestley was an unsuccessful attempt to create a master/servant duty of
care, and did not directly address the issue of fellow servant liability.
C. The Rise of Common Employment
In the thirteen year interval between the Court of Exchequer's
rulings in Priestley and those in Hutchinson v. York, Newcastle & Berwick
196
	 DICTIONARY or NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY, supra note 25, at 226;
THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 369 (1979) (observing
"a dominating influence in the Court of Exchequer").
157
 The more notable being Quarnian v. Burnett. 6 M. & W. 499, 151
1840), and Joel v. Morrison, 6 Car. & P. 502, 172 Eng. Rep. 1338 (Ex. 183
1983 Morph. & H. at 306.
139
 2 M. & W. at 530, 150 Eng. Rep. at 866.
140 See 3 Morph. & H. at 307.
sec also P.S. ATIYA II,
that Parke. B. plied
Eng. Rep. 509 (Ex.
4).
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Railway Co."' and Wigmore v. Jay "2 wherein the defence of common
employment was born "naked and unashamed,"I 43 no reported Eng-
lish case addressed the doctrine.'"
Hutchinson was an action brought under the Fatal Accidents
Act148 by the widow of a railway labourer killed when the carriage in
which he was conveyed collided with another of the defendant's car-
riages. 146 On a special demurrer before Pollock, C.B. and Parke,
Rolfe, Alderson, and Platt, B.B., plaintiff's counsel averred that "[t]he
only reported case bearing on the point" was Priestley. 147 That decision,
he argued, stood for the proposition that masters were not liable to
servants who could protect themselves using "common prudence and
caution," but that otherwise "why should a servant be without remedy
in cases where a stranger may sue?" 148 Defence counsel responded
that Hutchinson's claim could not prevail in light of the Court of Ex-
chequer's previous ruling in Priestley because, unlike a passenger, a
servant "virtually undertakes all ordinary risks" incident to his serv-
ice. 149 Without citing any legal basis, he then asserted that "it is diffi-
cult to see why a master should be responsible for the acts of his ser-
vants inter se."1" Following Parke, B.'s observation that. a related case
(meaning Wigmore v. Jay) had just been decided at nisi /nits,
Hutchinson's disposition was delayed six months so that the actions
could be determined together.'"
Delivering the opinion for the Court of Exchequer, Alderson, B.
echoed defence counsel's assertion, observing that the case at bar was
141 5 Ex, 343, 155 Eng, Rep. 150 (1850).
142 5 Ex. 354, 155 Eng. Rep. 155 (1850).
14t A. BnutELL, FOUR LECTURES ON '111E LAW OF EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY Al' HOME AND
ABROAD 26-27 (1897); see also A.H. MANCIIMER, A MODERN LEGAL. HISTORY OF ENGLAND
AND WALES 1750-1950, at 288 (1980) (noting that it was Hutchinson that "really established
the rule").
144 Although the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, in Farwell v. Boston &
Worcester R.R. Coip., 45 Mass. 49 (1842), would do so conclusively. The assertion by Rostal
that the Assize case Armsworth v. South Eastern Ry., 11 Jur. 758 (1848), indirectly raised the
issue is addressed below. Sec infra notes 254-257 and accompanying text.
145 Lord Campbell's Act (Fatal Accidents Act), 1846, 9 & 10 Vict., c. 93.
146
 Hutchinson, 5 Ex. at 343, 155 Eng. Rep. at 150.
147 Hutchinson, 5 Ex. at 346-47, 155 Eng. Rep. at 152.
145 Id.
146 Hutchinson, 5 Ex. at 348, 155 Eng. Rep. at 153.
150
151
 The assize decision in Wigmore v. Jay was. regrettably, unreported. Parke, B.'s remark
appears only in the Law Journal report, See 19 L.J. Ex. 296 (1850).
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"undistinguishable in principle from Prie,stley. 152 Although Alderson,
B, believed that the decision in Thiestley only went to Fowler's
(non)duty to Priestly as it related to the alleged overloading of the
van, he nevertheless extrapolated the underlying principles in
Abinger, C.B.'s dicta to the proposition that "a master is not in gen-
eral liable to one servant for damage resulting from the negligence of
another." 153
 This was because workers assumed these risks as part of
their contracts of service. 15" The only exception to this rule was when
a master exposed his servant to unreasonable harm by hiring incom-
petent fellow-workers. This exclusion not having been proven at trial
in the case at bar, Alderson, B. granted the demurrer denying widow
Hutchinson's claim. 155
 Thus, the Court of Exchequer re-interpreted
and extended the ratio of Priestley to create the doctrine of common
employment—a legal defence which had neither been raised by coun-
sel, nor utilised before in any reported English decision.
The awaited companion case to Hutchinson, Wigmore v. Jay, 156
 was
likewise a Fatal Accidents Act suit arising from a workman's death. In
Wigmore, a bricklayer died in the collapse of scaffolding knowingly
erected with an unsound ledger pole under a foreman's supervision.
At the conclusion of trial before Pollock, C.B. at the Middlesex Sit-
tings after Michaelmas Term 1849, the defendant broadly claimed
without elucidating "on the authority of Priestley," that the action
could not be maintained. The Chief Baron agreed, directing a verdict
for the defendant because he had not personally attended the scaf-
folding's construction. 157
Arguing for a new trial before the Court of Exchequer, Wig-
more's counsel, Watson, made a clever attempt to avoid the apparent
obstruction created by Priestley, while also making use of the recent
holding in Hutchinson. Mr. Watson asserted that Priestley was inappli-
cable because the ditty therein alleged "was similar to that of a com-
mon carrier."158
 Moreover, Wigmore involved the unequal status of a
bricklayer and his supervising construction foreman rather than the
interaction of fellow-servants. Next, alluding to Hutchinson, counsel
152 Hutchinson, 5 Ex. at 349, 155 Eng. Rep. at 153.
1" hi.
154 Hutchinson, 5 Ex. at 350, 155 Eng. Rep. at 154.
155 See Hutchinson, 5 Ex. at 349, 353, 155 Eng. Rep. at 154-55.
156 5 Ex. at 354, 155 Eng. Rep. at 155 (1850).
157
 Hu tchinson, 5 Ex. at 354, 356, 155 Eng. Rep. at 156.
155 WigMOIC, 5 Ex. at 357, 155 Eng. Rep. at 156.
2003]	 Priestley v. Fowler & the Emerging Tort of Negligence 	 715
maintained that his client's claim was also dissimilar in that it was
grounded in "a duty that arises out of the contract. of service" not to
use faulty equipment rather than in a master's general duty.'"
Unswayed by Watson's reasoning, Pollock, C.B. equated Wig-
more's claim in principle with the "doctrine laid down" in Priestley and
affirmed in Hutchinson. He therefore denied the motion on the
ground that the plaintiff had not proven the foreman either deficient
in skill or improperly employed. 160 By so holding, the Court of Ex-
chequer limited a master's liability to his servant to instances which
involved his personal, rather than vicarious actions.I 61 Once again, the
rationale for denying the plaintiff's claim had not been raised by de-
fence counsel at trial or on appeal.
Eight years after Hutchinson and Wigmore were handed down by
the Exchequer, the House of Lords "firmly and finally established" "G2
the doctrine of common employment, for both England and Scot-
land, in the jointly rendered decisions of Bartonshill Coal Co. v. Reid &
McGuire163
 by providing a precedent that was "accepted without
qualms by almost all the English judges." 164 The identity of the Law
Lords was of signal importance. Reid was argued before Cranworth,
L.C., who sat as the sole Law Peer (but who rendered the decision
from without the wool sack) ; 165 McGuire was heard and decided before
Lord Chancellor Chelmsford and Lords Brougham and Wensleydale.
Cranworth, as Rolfe, B., had participated in Hutchinson (but, not in
Wiginore); 166 Wensleydale, as Parke, B., had sat the bench in each of
the Court of Exchequer's decisions in Priestley, Hutchinson, and Wig-
159 Id.
166 Sec Wignune, 5 Ex. at 357-58, 155 Eng. Rep. at 156-57.
161 Sec Wigrnore, 5 Ex. at 358, 155 Eng. Rep. at 157.
162 A.H. RuEGG, A TREKrts E UPON -rut EMPLOYERS' LIA B I LITY ACT, I 880, at 7 (1882).
163 3 Marg. 265, 300 (1858). Although the House of Lords delivered two separate opin-
ions, only the first (which controlled the second's resolution) is typically referenced.
164 CORNISH & CLARK, 51/PM note 3, at 498. The decision would, however, meet with
much reproach, especially from Scottish commentators who viewed it as a form of legal
imperialism. Typical are the fulminations of A.D. Gibb. Sec A.D. Gain, LAW FROM OVER - DIE
BORDER: A SH ORT ACCOUNT OF A STRANGE JURISDICTION 58-59, 99-100 (1950). The valid-
ity of the view from over the Tweed, although for reasons other than those traditionally
given, will comprise a future article by this author.
165 Following the demise of Darby's brief ministry. Sec 17 DICTIONARY OF NATIONAL
BIOGRAPHY, supra note 25. at 160.
166
 Sitting in the Court of Exchequer from 1839 until he was appointed a Commis-
sioner of the Great Seal in June, 1850. about a month after Hutchinson. Id. at 159-60.
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more. 167
 Neither referred to Priestley, and citations to English cases for
the proposition of common employment, when they were given, were
to Hutchinson.' 68
 This glaring absence of reference to Priestley was re-
peated in the rulings given by Lords Cranworth and Wensleydale, re-
spectively, in a trio of House of Lords appeals from both Divisions of
the Inner House of Scotland's Court of Session that carved out lim-
ited exceptions to the doctrine of common employment.m
III. THE SUBSEQUENT HISTORY OF PRIESTLEY Ir. FOWLER
A. Contemporary Views of Priestley
Few Victorian jurists explicitly discussed Priestley v. Fordo: The ma-
jority of those who did, however, referenced the case for the general
absence of a duty of care by a master towards his servant rather than
for the doctrine of common employment. In so doing these judges,
not surprisingly, followed Parke, B., who had sat the bench in both
Priestley and Hutchinson v. York, and whose rulings in Quarman v. Bur-
ner° and in Joel v. Morrison"' attested to his authority in the field of
employers' vicarious liability. In Metcalfe v. Hethefington, 172
 wherein the
issue was responsibility for a ship collision, Baron Parke explained the
decision in Priestley as that "the Court considered the allegation of
167
 Lord Wensleydale of Walton was elevated to a peerage in tail male by patent on July
23, 1856, a month after oral argument in Reid, despite Lord Cranworth's having assidu-
ously promoted the government's position that it was empowered to confer a lifetime
peerage upon his erstwhile Court of Exchequer colleague. See 15 DICTIONARY OF NA-
TIONAL BIOGRAPHY, supra note 25, at 226; Letters Patent Creating the Right Honourable
Sir James Parke Knight, Baron Wensleydale (1856).
168
 Thus, Cranworth, L.C.: "The principle of the law of England I take to have been
ennunciated in the case of Hutchinson . ..." Bartonshill, 3 Macq. at 276. Parenthetically.
Lord Cranworth appended the entire Farwell opinion to his judgment in McGuire, thus
raising the interesting question of whether the real villain in the development of common
employment was not Abinger, C.B., but rather the redoubtable Lemuel Shaw. This seems
plausible because the eight year gap between Farwell and Hutchinson was sufficient for
knowledge of the former to have crossed the Atlantic. Such a scenario also raises the pos-
sibility that the "influence" which is normally thought to have proceeded in only one di-
rection during this period, from England towards America, might in fact have also went
the other way.
169 See Weems v, Nfathieson, 4 Macq. 215 (1861); Brydon v. Stewart, 2 Macq. 30 (1855);
Paterson v. Wallace & Co., 1 Macq. 748 (1854).
170
 6 M. & W. 499,151 Eng. Rep. at 509 (Ex. 1840).
171
 6 Car. & P. 502, 172 Eng. Rep 1338 (Ex. 1834).
172
 11 Ex. 257, 156 Eng. Rep. 826 (1855).
2003]	 Priestley v. Fowler e.o' the Ewetgitig Tort of Negligence	 717
duty as altogether insufficient, the declaration not stating facts from
which duty could be inferred."'"
Illustrative of the judiciary tracking Parke, B.'s lead are the opin-
ions given by Crompton and Blackburn, J.J. in Mellors u Shaw & Un-
win. 174 At the Yorkshire Lent. Assizes before Keating, J., the plaintiff, a
collier, alleged that he had been injured when descending a shaft that
had been knowingly constructed in an unsafe manner by the defen-
dant. mine owners, one of whom was also the on-site manager. After
Keating, J. declined to nonsuit the plaintiff, the jury returned a £1 50
verdict, finding that. Shaw and Unwin had been personally negligent
in the matter. Defendants' counsel obtained a rule to enter a nonsttit
or in arrest of judgment on the ground that the declaration did not
sustain a cause of action. 175
At oral argument before the King's Bench the following Easter
Term, both parties' counsel relied upon Priestley for the same proposi-
tion, namely that the declaration would be unsupportable if Mellors
had actually known about. the defect. They disagreed, however, on
whether the declaration alleged Mellor's ignorance of the defect suf-
ficiently so as to make a prima facie claim. Neither side raised the pos-
sibility of the shaft having been either built or maintained by plain-
tiff's fellow servants. 176 In discharging the rule, Crompton, J. reflected
"that the rule laid down in [Priestley], that a servant on entering the
service of an employer takes upon himself the risks of the service,
does not apply where there has been personal negligence in the mas-
ter which causes the injury to the servant."'" Blackburn, J. added that
"[t] he ground of the decision is that there was no warranty on the
part of the master that the carriage should be free from defects or
that no injury should happen to his servant." 175
Accordingly, when decisions referenced precedents for the prin-
ciple of common employment, as a matter of course they cited to Bar-
173 Metcalfe, 11 Ex. at 270, 156 Eng. Rep. at 832.
174 I B. & S. 437, 442, 445, 121 Eng. Rep. 778, 780-81 (1(.11. 1861).
175 11 fellow, 1 B. & S. at 437, 439, 121 Eng. Rep. at 779.
176 Mellon, 1 B. & S. at 440, 442, 121 Eng. Rep. at 779-80. Plaintiff was represented by
Messrs. Mainsty and Quail, defendants by Mr. T. Jones (of the Northern Circuit).
177 Mellon, 1 B. & S. at 443, 121 Eng. Rep. at 780. He expressed a similar view in Clarke
v. Holmes. 7 H. & N. 937, 938, 946, 158 Eng. Rep. 751, 754-55 (Ex. 1862), a decision up-
holding liability for personal negligence in failing to fence dangerous machinery.
176 Mellon, 1 B. & S. at 446, 121 Eng. Rep. at 781.
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tonshill Coal Co. v. Reid & McGuire or Hutchinson.' 79
 Especially notewor-
thy in this regard is the decision by Alderson, B. (secure, perhaps, in
having announced Hutchinson's opinion) in Wiggett v. Fox &
Henderson,"P an appeal from a verdict given under Lord Campbell's Act
for the death of a worker engaged in erecting a tower for the Crystal
Palace. Making the rule absolute on the ground that the deceased was
in common employment with the negligent actors, Baron Alderson held
that "Wile true principle is, in our opinion, to be found in" Hutchinson,
namely, "that a master is not in general responsible to one servant for an
injury occasioned to him by the negligence of a fellow servant whilst
they are acting in one common service." 181
More ample evidence of Priestley's restriction as a precedent is
found in contemporary treatises where the actual decision is cited for
either the general proposition that no implied duty of care extended
from masters to their servants, or for the specific holding that a mas-
ter was not held responsible for an unknown wagon defect. 182
 A repre-
sentative sampling includes treatises ptiblished by R.J. Browne in
1843, 183
 (Lord) P. Fraser in 1846, 184
 C.G. Addison in 1847, 183 1B. Hert-
slet in 1850, 188 Melville Bigelow in 1875, 187 C, Petersdorff in 1876, 188.
178 As in Wright u London & North Western Ry., 1 Q.B.D. 252, 257 (1876), or Ashworth v.
Stanurix, 3 El. & El. 701, 121 Eng. Rep. 606, 607 (KB. 1860). See, as well, the arguments
made by counsel in Tarrant v. Webb, 18 C.B. 797, 139 Eng. Rep. 1585, 1586 (C.P. 1856).
147 11 Ex. 832, 156 Eng. Rep. 1069 (1856).
18 ' Wiggett, 11 Ex. at 838, 156 Eng. Rep. at 1072.
182 See W.C. SPENS & R.T. YOUNGER, THE LAW OF EMPLOYERS AND EMPLOYED AS RE-
GARDS REPARATION FOR PHYSICAL INJURY 65 (1887). The authors quote the testimony of
Mr. C.P. Ilbert of the Indian Legislature before the Select Committee on Employers' Liabil-
ity in July 1876 as: "I do not think that any distinct rule is laid down on the case. Priestley u
Fowler is cited as an authority for the rule for which it is not in reality an authority." Id.
183 R.J. BROWNE, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON ACTIONS AT LAW 184 11.0 (1843).
184
 2 P. FRASER, A TREATISE ON
	 LAWS OF SCOTLAND 426 (1846).
la' C.C. ADDISON, A TREATISE ON 111E LAW OF CONTRACTS, AND RIGHTS AND LEABILI-
TIES EX CONTRACTU 740 (1847).
188 CJ.B. HERTSLET, THE LAW RELA11NG 1U MASTER AND SERVANT. COMPRISING Do-
MESTIC AND MENIAL SERVANTS AND CLERKS, HUSBANDMEN, AND PERSONS EMPLOYED IN
THE DIFFERENT MANUFACTURES 8-9 (1850).
187
 M.M. BIGELOW, LEADING CASES ON -ntE LAW OF TORTS 707 (1875).
188 C. PETERSDORFF, A PitActicAt, COMPENDIUM OF THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT
44 (2d ed. 1999) (1876). Perhaps not surprisingly for, as will be shown below, Petersdorff
had represented the widow Armsworth.
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Paterson in 1885, 189 W.H. Roberts and G.H Wallace in 1885, 190 F. Pol-
lock in 1887, 191 and H. Fraser in 1888) 92
Perhaps the clearest example of nineteenth century practitio-
ners' understanding of Priestley appears in T. Beven's 1889 treatise on
negligence, wherein he expatiates at length that the decision com-
prises no more than a failed negligence action.'" For, although "the
germ of the law laying down the master's immunity" might be traced
to Priestley, the actual decision went only to the issue of whether Fow-
ler had either overloaded the van or kept it in poor repair. 194 Thus,
"[t]he decision merely enunciates the broad proposition . . . that
there is no duty implied by law in certain cases for the master to take
those precautions for the safety of his servant that he would be held to
with regard to strangers."'" Moreover, "the legal relationship of fellow
servant as affecting their employer is not raised, since the case does
not even suggest that the defendant had another servant other than
the plaintiff."'" This was because "the element of negligence of one
servant causing danger to another was entirely absent." 197 Conse-
quently, "the duty of the master to the servant with regard to the em-
ployment of fellow servants ... was first formulated by Alderson, B. in
Hatchinson," 198 while Bartonshill Coal "was the starting point. of a large
number of decisions the general effect of which was indefinitely to
extend" the doctrine of common employment)"
As with judges, treatise writers of that period likewise cite to other
cases, usually Bartonshill Coal or Hutchinson, for the genesis of the
J, PKIERSON, NOTES ON 111E LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT, WITH ALL 111E
AU111011 MIES 56 (1885).
I 90 Stu W.H. ROBERTS &	 WALLACE. THE DUTY AND LIABILITY OF EMPLOYERS AS
WELL TO THE PUBLIC AS TO SERVANTS M41) WORKMEN 136-38 (3d ed. 1885).
191 Stu F. POLLOCK, THE LAW OF TouTs 84 n.x (1887).
I 92 SLR 11, FRASER, A COMPENDIUM 01"111E LAW OF TORTS 110 (1888).
193 T. BEVEN, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NEGLIGENCE 370-72 (1889) [hereinafter
BEVEN, PRINCIPLES]. Bever initially raised this point in an earlier treatise. See 'I'. BEVEN,
Tut: LAW OF 111E EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY FOR THE NEGLIGENCE OF SERVANIN CAUSING IN-
JURY TO Ftt.t.ow SERVANTS 19-20 (1881) [hereinafter BEVEN, Ent PLoYER's LIABILITY].
194 BEVEN, PRINCIPLES, supra note 193, at 370-71.
195 Id. at 372.
186 Id,
197 Id. at 375.
1 g8 Id. at 356.
BEVEN, PRINCIPLES, supra note 193, at 378.
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common employment doctrine. 200
 Some studies of employers' liabil-
ity, which included sections on common employment, did not even
allude to Priestley. 201
B. Revising Priestley
Despite a plurality of nineteenth century judges and a vast major-
ity of coterminous treatise writers correctly reading Priestley as a failed
attempt to create master/servant liability, that decision rather than
the one in Hutchinson eventually came to represent the origin of
common employment. 202
This was due to a combination of four reasons.203 First, by deline-
ating all the possible undesirable consequences of upholding liability
in Priestley, Abinger, C.B. played to the fears of future judges against
creating new forms of employers' accountability. 204
 Second, in deny-
ing a master/servant duty of care based upon "general principles" of
political economy that catered to prevailing notions of class perspec-
200 See. e.g., ADDISON, supra note 101, at 248; BEVEN, EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY. supra note
193, at 20-21; BEVEN, PRINCIPLES, supra note 193, at 356, 378; M.M. BIGELOW, Ei.par.N .ts
OF E LAW OF TORTS FOR THE USE OF STUDENTS 302 (1878); J. PATERSON, A COMPENDIUM
OF ENGLISH AND SCOTTISH LAW 273 (1860); PATERSON, supm note 189, at 49; PETF.RS-
DORFF, supra note 188, at 44 (also citing to Priestley).
201
 See, e.g., BEVEN, EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY, supra note 193. See generally W. BOWSTEAD,
THE LAW RELATING 10 WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION UNDER TnE WORKMEN'S COMPENSA-
TION ACTS 1897 & 1900 (1901); A. MAcnONAI.D, HANIWBOOK OF THE LAW RELATIVE TO
MASTERS, WORKMEN, SERVANTS AND APPRENTICES. IN Au. TRADES AND OCCUPATIONS
(1868); A. PARSONS & T.A, BERTRAM, THE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACTS, 1897 AND
1900 (1900); A. ROBINSON, EMPLOYERS LIABILITY UNDER 111E WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
ACT, 1897 AND THE EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY ACT, 1880 (1898).
2°2
 This view was consistently held by Pollock, C.B. See, e.g., Waller v. S. E. Ry. Co., 2 H.
& C. 102, 110-11, 159 Eng. Rep. 43, 46 (Ex. 1863) (referring to the decision where com-
mon employment was in "principle laid down for the first time"); Riley v. Baxendale, 6 H.
& N. 445, 448, 158 Eng. Rep. 183, 184 (Ex. 1861) (The doctrine in Priestley "ought not to
be trenched upon. Servants are often far better judges than their masters of the dangers
incident to their employment, and whether their fellow servants are trustworthy per-
sons."); Vose v. London & Yorkshire Ry. Co., 27 U. Ex. 249, 2 H. & N. 728, 734, 157 Eng.
Rep. 300, 303 (1858) (declaring that "Lillie law must have been the same long before it
was enunciated in this Court in the case of Priestley").
203
 The author will delineate the larger story of how and why the doctrine of common
employment gained its ascendancy in a future work.
204
 Of whom the Exchequer Barons were a particularly warm audience. Examples of
their rulings quashing the extension of the independent tort of negligence are: Riley, 158
Eng. Rep. at 183; Dynen v. Leach, 26 L.J. Ex. 221 (1857); Roberts v. Smith, 2 H. & N. 213,
157 Eng. Rep. 89 (Ex. 1857); Metcalfe, 11 Ex. at 257, 157 Eng. Rep. at 1367; Winterbottom
v. Wright, 10 M. & W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842).
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tive, Priestley was attractive to judges who would later expand, often
creatively, upon its reasoning. 205 Third, the hypothetical extrapola-
tions enumerated in Abinger, C.B.'s dictum, in combination with the
general principles upon which the decision itself was based, provided
judges with fertile ground from which to grow further the defence of
common employment. 206 Fourth, some judges, as well as legal com-
mentators, were simply confused about the facts precipitating
Miestley2°7 and thus believed that the actions of fellow servants were
involved. 2°6 In contrast, Alderson, B.'s ruling in Hutchinson was staid,
dispassionate, constructed narrowly, and in reality involved the negli-
gent actions of fellow servants.209
205 Amongst those principles, which "oweldl an obvious debt to the lingua franca of po-
litical economy," Cornish and Clark enumerated that servants were familiar with the risks
of their employment and that they were thus free not to encounter known dangers. Cox-
N ISIt & CLARK, supra note 3, at 498.
260 This was certainly the understanding espoused by Brett, L.J. when giving testimony
before the Select Committee on Employers' Liability in July 1876. See SrENS & YOUNGER,
supra note 182, at 66. His explanation, as reproduced by Spens and Younger, was that
Lord Abinger, who had been one of the greatest advocates ever known at the
bar, had an advocate's talent, which mainly consists in the invention of analo-
gies. and there never was a more perfect master of that art than Lord Abinger,
and he took it with him to the bench; and I think it may be suggested that the
law as to the non-liability of masters with regard to fellow servants arose princi-
pally from the ingenuity of Lord Abinger in suggesting analogies in the case of
Priestley v. Fowler:
Id.
207 "Priatity V. FOIlder was one of those unsatisfactory cases in which, under the old sys-
tem, the question did not arise upon what were the real facts, but upon how they were
stated on the record." BEVEN, PRINCIPLES, Si/pia note 193, at 370 n.3 (quoting Brett, L.J. in
response to question 1922, giving evidence before the House of Commons Committee on
Employers' Liability, 1877).
206 For example, T.W.S. Firth reasoned that "the van was overloaded by the negligence
of other servants of the master" and that Priestley attempted "their negligence [to] be
imputed to the master, so as to make him liable." T.W.S. FIRTH, ON THE LAW RELATING "to
LIABILFIT OF EMPLOYERS FOR INJURIES SUFFERED BY THEIR SERVANTS IN I.: COURSE
or THEIR EMPLOYMENT 18 (1890); see also C.Y.C. DAWBARN, EMPLOYERS' LtAtin.rrk"ro
THEIR SERVANTS AT COMMON LAW AND UNDER '111E EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY ACT 1880 AND
'nit: WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACTS 1897 AND 1900, at 2 (1903) (describing the accident
as occurring after the waggon had been "overloaded by the negligence of another fellow
servant"). In contrast, Simpson suggested that mutton suppliers might have done the load-
ing. See SIMPSON, SUPPE?. note 2, at 103.
200 To be expected, perhaps, from a man described as having been "a strong church-
man of moderate tendencies" and "a humane judge." 1 DICI1ONARY OF NATIONAL 1310G-
RAPIIY, SUM note 25, at 243.
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The recasting of Priestley, however, proceeded in a slow, non-
linear progression, as a minority of judges began to equivocate on the
significance of the decision. For example, Bowen, L.J. in Thomas v.
Quartermaine refers to "the much canvassed case of Priestley v. Foram;
and a series of decisions following in its train,"210 while Erle, C.J. in
Tunney v. Midland Railway Ca. declared that "Nile rule has been set-
tled by a series of cases, beginning with" Priestley "that a servant under-
takes all ordinary risks of employment, including those arising from
fellow servants. 211
 On occasion, two judges gave different views of
Priestley within the same opinion. 212 Thus, the ruling's significance was
recast and expanded so as to originate the doctrine of common em-
ployment.
The same phenomenon was paralleled in treatises. As a group,
legal commentators moved from narrowly utilising Priestley to illus-
trate masters' general nonliability to their servants, to vacillating on
the decision's significance, 2" to eventually stating the now-received
wisdom that Priestley originated the doctrine of common employ-
ment. 2"
A good illustration of the evolution of this revisionist view can be
seen by comparing the three editions of Spike's treatises on mas-
ter/servant law. The first edition, published in 1839, reports Priestley
as going to the lack of duty of masters towards their servants, adding
almost as an afterthought, that it may also apply to "other servants." 2"
210
 18 Q.B.D. 685, 692 (1887).
211 1 L.R.C.P. 291, 296 (1865).
212
 Compare, for example, the reasoning provided by Ede, C.J. with that of Willes, J.
Lovegrove v. London, Brighton & South Coast Railway Co., 16 C.B. (N.S.) 669, 688, 693, 143
Eng. Rep. 1289, 1297, 1299 (C.P. 1864).
215 Among the prominent waverers was J.N.V. Saimond. See J.W. SALMOND, THE LAW OF
TORTS: A TREATISE ON THE ENGLISH LAW OF LIABILITV FOR CIVIL INJURIES 92 (1907) (stat-
ing that the doctrine of common employment was initially applied in Priestley, but "first
definitely formulated" in Hutchinson).
214 See, e.g., J.F. CLERK &	 LINDSELL, TILE LAW OF TORTS 57 (1889). This repre-
sentation continued through many editions, the most recent of which was published in
2000.
215 E. SPIRE, THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT, IN REGARD TO DOMESTIC SERVAN'IS
AND CLERKS 43 (1839).
By the relation of master and servant, no contract is implied, and therefore no
duty created, on the part of the master, to make good to the servant any dam-
age arising to him from any vice or imperfection (unknown to the master) ex-
isting in the article or thing used in his service, or from the mode of using the
same; nor for the negligence of his other servants.
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The second edition, published in 1855, 214 initially cites Priestley for the
proposition that servants were bound to take as much care as their
masters, 217 repeats verbatim the paragraph on Priestley, 218 and then
discusses Hu.Iclrirrson, Wigrnore, and Skipp v. Eastern Counties Railway
Co.219 to illustrate the defence of common employment, especially as a
bar to actions brought under Lord Campbell's Act.22° The third and
final edition, published in 1872 (under Spike's name, but in fact writ-
ten by fellow Inner Temple barrister C.H. Bromby), 221 repeats the
aforementioned and adds in relation to the doctrine of common em-
ployment. that Priestley is "usually regarded as the leading case upon
this branch of the law. "222
C. Other Interpretations of Priestley
Brian Simpson offered the most cogent, as well as functional, ex-
planation of Priestley's suit, 223 demonstrating that the action was "a
move to fill in a gap in a protection which had formerly existed." 224
sum, this "gap" developed after passage of the 1834 Poor Law
Amendment Act225 which brought in its wake new methods of eco-
nomical management for relieving the destitute. These included the
merging of parishes to pool medical providers, offering paupers loans
rather than providing for assistance, and requiring local Board of
Id.
210 E. SPIRE, THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT, IN REGARD TO CLERKS, ARTIZANS,
DoMESTIC SERVANTS, AND LABOURERS IN HUSBANDRY (2d ed. 1855).
217 Thus, "a paid servant is bound to observe with care and diligence the interests of
his master, and to exercise the same vigilance and attention as the master himself would
have." id. at 22.
2Ia Id. at 50; see also id. at 50-52 (quoting the opinion at length).
215 9 Ex, 223,156 Eng. Rep. 95 (1853).
220 SPIKE, supra note 216, at 52. All three issued from the Exchequer.
221 E, SPIKE, THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT, IN REGARD 'ID CLERICS, AR'llZANS,
DOMESTIC SERVANTS, AND LABOURERS IN IIUSRANnRV (3d ed. 1872).
222 Id.
 at 60.
225 See SIMPSON, supra note 2, at 100-34. Simpson's analysis seems to have been either
inspired or anticipated by Kostal. See Kos .rm„ supra note 8, at 260-61 ("Et1he very fact that
a lawsuit was commenced indicates that Priestley had taken a dim view of the relief avail-
able to him under the recently reformed Poor Laws"); id. at 261 n.33 ("More research
needs to be done to determine how Poor Law reform affected labourers and their fami-
lies.").
224 See SIMPSON, supra note 2, at 117.
225 (Poor Law Amendment Act), 1834,4 & 5 Will. IV, c. 76.
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Guardian approval prior to ministering casual accident victims.226 Al-
though two of Simpson's interpretations of the related case law are
suspect, 227
 his insightful reasoning that changes in the Poor Law
stimulated Priestley's lawsuit is convincing.
Nonetheless, the dearth of pre -Priestley precedent evidences to
Richard Epstein "an ironclad rule of breathtaking simplicity: no em-
ployee could ever recover from any employer for any workplace acci-
dent—period."228
 This "ironclad rule" reflected a communal under-
standing that
an employee should be grateful for the opportunity of gain-
ful employment.... In a society in which disease and injury
were rampant, and life itself fragile and short.... Why
should the legal system intervene on behalf of those fortu-
nate enough to gain employment when there were countless
others, far worse off, who would gladly trade places with
them?229
However appealing (and paradoxical that the politically libertar-
ian) Epstein's melodramatic explanation may be to those inclined to-
wards the Marxist school of historical inquiry, 230
 it nonetheless begs
the question of why industrial accidents were unique among die
panoply of work-related grievances. Had servants been that intimi-
dated and repressed, they would never have taken any action against
226 See SIMPSON, supra note 2. at 123-27.
227
 Namely, that as of 1837 case law (1) was settled that servants injured during the
course of their service gained settlements in the parishes of their employment, and (2)
had been unclear on the question of a master's liability to provide medical assistance for
his injured servants. The former is an accurate statement of the law prior to 1795, but fails
to account for ensuing rulings made by Ellenborough, C.J.'s King's Bench, which took the
opposite position, denying settlements to incapacitated servants. See, e.g., R. v. Inhabitants
of Sudbrooke, 4 East 356,102 Eng. Rep. 867 (KB. 1803). As to the latter, Simpson is cor-
rect that by the time of Queen Victoria's ascension the law was settled that masters were
not legally responsible for providing medical treatment to their ailing servants unless they
themselves solicited or acquiesced in the care. The law was, however, also settled at an
earlier date. See, for example, the unequivocal statement of J. Chitty. J. Cum -rv, A PRACTI-
CAL TREATISE ON 71IE LAW OF Con-Imams NOT' UNDER SEAL 459 (2d ed. 1834); see also
FRASER, supra note 184, at 423-25; SPIRE, SUpt11 note 221, at 53-57.
228 Epstein, supm note 6, at 777. See generally Roatarts Sc WALLACE, supra note 183, at
179-80.
221/ Epstein, supra note 6, at 777.
226 Most prominently, MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW
1780-1860 (1977).
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their masters. Yet, servants frequently sued for wages, 23 i hauled their
masters before magistrates to complain of ill treatment and to compel
contractual adherence,232 and even brought actions for libel when
references endangered their future employment. 233 It should also be
noted that rioting and striking were not unknown occurrences among
disaffected workers. Nevertheless, Epstein's explanation might well be
an accurate depiction of judicial attitudes and class perspective during
the nineteenth century. 234
The frequency with which servants pursued judicial action
against their masters outside the context of work-related injuries also
diminishes the otherwise persuasive argument that posits prohibitive
litigation costs as the reason workers did not seek legal redress for
their harms. The most compelling support for this assertion is put
forth by Bartrip and Burman who explain that because the older local
courts—such as the Liverpool Court of Passage—often had jurisdic-
tional limitations below £5, workmen were forced to seek redress in
one of the central courts where costs, fees, and legal expenses made
litigation unlikely. Legal aid was also a remote option because impe-
cunious plaintiffs still had to obtain a lawyer's certificate affirming
their claims as viable. As a result of this requirement "a vicious circle
was created whereby an applicant came to court for gratuitous legal
services because he could not beg for a lawyer's services," only to find
"that he must beg or pay for a lawyer's certificate before the court
"I A fact attested to by the inclusion of methods to allege and defend these claims in
the younger Chitty's pleading manual. Seel Otrrrv, PRECEDENTS IN PLEADING %Tut CO-
PIOUS NOTES ON PRACTICE, PLEADING AND EVIDENCE 148-51, 351-56 (1836).
282 Utilising, among other provisions, the Regulation of Servants and Apprentices Act,
1746, 20 Geo. II, c. 19, which empowered magistrates to hear, determine, and remedy
claims of refusal or non-payment of wages between masters and servants in husbandry
hired for one year or longer at less than £10; or small craftsmen, labourers or artificers
contracted for under £5. R. u Inhabitants of Poles-worth, 2 Barn. & Aid. 483, 106 Eng. Rep.
442 (K.B. 1819), and Lowther v. Radnor, 3 East 113, 103 Eng. Rep. 287 (K.B. 1806), are
among the cases which demonstrate the statute's frequent usage.
2" Although not with great success, due to damages only being recoverable when the
character given was patently false. slanderous, and malicious. See, for example, Kelly v.
Partington, 4 Barn. & Ad. 700, 110 Eng. Rep. 619 (K.B. 1833), which denied a suit by a
shopwoman against her former master for libel in issuing an unflattering character, be-
cause actual malice had not been shown. Nevertheless, some plaintiffs did succeed. For
instance, in Fountain v. Boodle, 3 Q.B. 5, 114 Eng. Rep. 408 (1842), the Queen's Bench
sustained a libel verdict against a master on the evidence that he had recommended the
governess/plaintiff on two prior occasions.
2" As argued persuasively in Michael J. Klarman, The judge qrsus the Unions: the Devel-
opment of British Labour Law, 1867-1913, 75 VA. L. REV. 1487 (1989).
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would hear him."236
 Still, in spite of these difficulties in bringing suit,
Bartrip and Burman suggest that the "unsensational reporting" of
Priestley "indicateisi that such cases had come to court before, at the
Assize lever236
While this last hypothesis has not been substantiated, it goes
hand-in-hand with Terrance Ingman's assertion that Priestley coun-
tered an already established employers' liability. 237
 Specifically, he
contends that cases of "ill-treatment of apprentices, the health and
welfare of servants, and the working conditions of seamen," were
"consistent with an employer's duty of care prior to 1837." 238
 Al-
though this assertion is given more case law support in his unpub-
lished doctoral thesis239
 (which is cited with approbation by Bartrip
and Burman), 24° it is nonetheless incorrect.
To begin with, the legal status of menial servants, apprentices,
and seamen were significantly different. Next, the apprentice cases
are irrelevant as they involve harm that was caused intentionally, not
through inadvertence. 241
 The seamen and apprentice cases are like-
wise extraneous as their working conditions were governed by custom
which varied from that which regulated servants, 242 In addition, the
cases Ingman cited in proof of the contention that employers were
bound to care for their workers are unsupportive of that proposi-
tion.243 Lamb v. Buna244
 held that medical care for casual paupers is
235 See BARTR1P & BURMAN, supra note 24, at 25-28; John M. Maguire, Poverty and Civil
Litigation, 36 HARV. 1.. REv. 361, 377 (1923); see also KosTAL, supra note 8, at 261 (noting
the rise in popularity of contingency arrangements during the Victorian period).
238 See BARTity & BURMAN, Slip? note 24, at 25.
237 See generally Ingman, Rise and Fall, supra note 7.
238
 Id. at 109.
2!B
	 Terrence Ingman, The Origin and Development up to 1899 of the Employer's
Duty at Common Lew to Take Reasonable Care for the Safety of his Employee (1972).
240 See BARTR1P & BURMAN, supra note 24, at 104-05, 104 n.20.
211 See Wilkins v. Wells, 2 Car. & P. 231, 172 Eng. Rep. 104 (Ex. 1825); Winstone v. Linn,
1 B. & C. 460, 107 Eng. Rep. 171 (K.B. 1823).
242
 Legislation also altered the status and treatment of seamen as distinct from that of
servants. Thus, the ruling by Denman, CJ. in Kitchen v. Shaw, 6 Ad.& E. 729, 112 Eng. Rep.
280, 281-82 (KB. 1837), that the Regulation of Apprentices Act, 1766. 6 Geo. 3. c. 25,
which allowed a magistrate to jail certain servants for absenting themselves from service
without permission, was not applicable to (domestic) servants.
243 See Limland v. Stephens, 3 Esp. 269, 170 Eng. Rep. 611 (K.B. 1801) (holding that
master had no action against seaman for desertion where desertion was necessary to his
well being); Woolf v. Clagett, 3 Esp. 257, 170 Eng. Rep. 607 (C.P. 1800); Watson v. Christie
2 Bos. & Pul. 224, 126 Eng. Rep. 1248 (C.P. 1800) (finding defendant captain liable for
assault on plaintiff seaman).
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the responsibility of the parish where the "infirm and indigent body is
found."245 Cooper v. Phillips 246 represented the proposition that masters
were only liable for medical attendance that they directly solicited for
their servants. 247 Perhaps most telling is the absence of citation by
Bartrip and Burman to the handful of cases in Ingman's thesis that
even more clearly contradict his assertion. 248
Moreover, as an example involving Lord Kenyon demonstrates,
the reluctance of Abinger, C,B.'s Court of Exchequer to create new
master/servant duties in the absence of precedent was not atypical. In
Canal v. Bird, 249 domestic servant Carrol brought an action on the
case by her husband against her former employer Bird for not provid-
ing her with a reference, The declaration stated that after being dis-
missed by Bird, Carrol applied to a Mrs. Stewart who "was ready and
willing" to hire her upon receipt of an acceptable character. Carrol
alleged "that it was the duty of the defendant by law to have given her
such character as she deserved," but "that the defendant, not regard-
ing such her duty, wholly refused to give her any character whatever,"
resulting in Carrol's continued unemployment. Kenyon, C.J. asked
plaintiff's counsel upon opening the proceedings "Mf they had any
precedent for this action, or had ever known of such an action being
maintained?" Receiving a negative response, Lord Kenyon declared
the action unsustainable, for "in the case of domestic and menial ser-
vants, there was no law to compel the master to give the servant a
character. "250
In a second article drawn from his thesis, Ingman asserts that
Priestley allowed the development of the defence of volotti non. fit inju-
ria. 2" Simpson disagrees with Ingman, opining that Lord Abinger de-
244 4 M. & S. 274 (1815).
245 Id.
296 4 car. & P. 581, 172 Eng. Rep. 834 (K.B. 1831).
247 Id.
248 She BARTR IP & BuRmAN, supra note 24, at 25; Ingman, supra note 239.
249 3 Esp. 202, 170 Eng. Rep. 588 (C.P. 1800).
299 Id. An analogous rejection of an unknown duty also occurred within the context of
criminal negligence. Thus, the King's Bench in In the Mauer of Anon „ Overseer of Anon, 3 Ad.
& E. 552, 111 Eng. Rep. 524 (1835), declined to grant a criminal information against an
overseer who refused to vaccinate the parish's paupers for small-pox, even after one had
died. Its reasoning was that although "these unfortunate occurrences would not have
taken place" had the overseer acted otherwise, because there was "no law which prescribes
that precautionary measures" had to be taken, the administrator was not answerable. See id.
254 See Ingman. Histool, supra note 7.
728	 Boston College Law Review
	 [Vol. 44:689
cided the case upon the "individualistic notions of fault and responsi-
bility" between employers and employees rather than on a type of
"contractual theory" implicit in volenti. 252
 Both are correct, as their
explanations are not exclusive. While Simpson's assertion accurately
describes the actual ratio of Priestley, Ingman's interpretation deline-
ates some future ramifications of the decision.
Convinced that Priestley was both analytically and technically poor,
R.W. Kostal is sceptical regarding the case's importance, instead be-
lieving it to be the "unreliable precedent of an unreliable judge." 2" In
support of his contention, Kostal cites the little known case of Arm-
sworth v. South Eastern Railway,254
 brought under the Fatal Accidents
Act255
 following a railway worker's death through the negligence of his
fellow employees. The action was tried at the Surrey Summer Assizes
before Parke, B. who instructed the jury that it could find the defen-
dant company vicariously liable if its servants were at fault. A verdict
was returned for the widow Armsworth. 255
 Because neither Parke, B.
nor either side's counsel cited Priestley or "any other case indicating
that respondeat superior did not apply in circumstances where one of an
employer's servants inadvertently caused injury to another," Kostal
concluded that Priestley's decision was "unreliable."257
Several flaws undermine Kostal's reasoning. First, at the time of
trial, Priestley was the only recorded decision of an employee suing his
employer for accidental injury. 258
 Thus, beyond Priestley, no precedent
25' See SIMPSON, supra note 2, at 109.
2" Kosist., supnq note 8, at 268, 263,
254 11 Jur. 758 (1848).
25 ' Lord Campbell's Act (Fatal Accidents Act), 1846, 9 & 10 Viet., c. 93.
2' 8 Id.
257 See KOSTAL, supra note 8, at 267.
258
 Although so recognised by commentators for almost a century, Bartrip and Burman
found this claim questionable but were unable to refute it. despite their plausible hypothe-
sis that similar cases existed at the assize level. BA RTRIP BURMAN, supra note 24, at 24-25.
More than a century earlier, citing dicta in Gallagher v. Piper, 16 C.B.(N.S.) 677, 143 Eng.
Rep. 1289 (C.P. 1864) (Willes,].), and in lbw v. London &' Yorkshire Rly. Go, 157 Eng. Rep.
at 300 (Pollock, C.B.), Bevel' made a similar assertion. See BEVEN, EMPLOYERS' Linintxrv,
supra note 193, at 19. These judges might have had in mind Newby v. Wiltshire, 2 Esp. 739,
170 Eng. Rep. 515 (1(.8. 1784), which addressed the related claim by a parish officer
against a farmer for the medical costs occasioned by a casual injury to his servant under
circumstances strikingly similar to those of Priestley. The catalogue of treatise writers who
recognised Ptiest/ey's novelty includes: DAWBARN, supra note 208, at 2; ROBEWIS & WALLACE,
supra note 190, at 179-80; SALMOND, supra note 213, at 91; F.R. TURNER, A TREATISE oN
THE EMPLOYERS' LlAntu-ry ACT 1880, at 9 (1882). While testifying before the Select Com-
mittee on Employers' Liability in July 1876, one witness responded as follows to Pollock. C.B.'s
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existed for either counsel to cite. 259 Next, and of more consequence,
is Kostal's interpreting the ruling in Priestley as one going to vicarioits
liability when the actual basis of the decision went only to a master's
direct negligence towards his servant.. It was because of this limitation
that Priestley was irrelevant to the litigants as a precedent. Third,
Parke, B.'s jury instructions indicate that he may have believed the
Fatal Accidents Act, with which he was not familiar, further sanctioned
liability in these circumstances. 288 This confusion, perhaps surprising
in a jurist as esteemed as Parke, B., was noted at the time by at least
one treatise writer. 281 From those same instructions it may also be in-
ferred that, in the dozen years since Priestley, Parke, B. may have been
sufficiently influenced by successful railway passenger litigation to be-
lieve that contrary to Abinger, C.B.'s fiery dictum, "the mere relation
of master and servant" could indeed imply a common-law duty "on
the part of the master, to cause the servant to be safely and securely
carried" when conveyed on his master's railway. 282 Lastly, contrary to
having been "unreliable," Abinger, C.B.'s dictum was very cleverly
worded, providing fodder for successive judges to expand the doc-
trine of common employment. 263 Regardless of which explanation is
correct, Parke, B.'s jury instructions clearly indicate that as late as
continent from Vase: "All I can say is, that there is no trace of it in the law books at any earlier
date than this, and no reference appears to have been made to it by the counsel" for Fowler,
"tyjet it is hardly possible that he should not have referred to such a rule if it existed." SPENS
& YOUNGER, SUPM note 182, at 66.
259 A stronger argument for Kostal to have made would have been the one set forth
above, namely, that in giving House of Lords decisions on common employment, neither
Parke nor Rolfe (as Law Peers) cited Priestley. Nonetheless, this assertion would also have
failed for the reasons that follow below in text. Sec infra notes 260-265 and accompanying
text.
250 am called on for the first time, to assist in the trial of a case arising under a statue
passed last year, which has made a great change in the law of England." Arrasivorth, 11 Jur.
at 760.
261 Thus, in the second edition of his treatise, Spike noted in relation to Priestley: "This
important judgment, every word of which may be considered deserving of attention in any
case where it is sought to hold a master liable for an injury received by a person in his em-
ploy, has recently been questioned in actions under Lord Campbell's Act." SPIRE, supra
note 216, at 52. It may also be inferred from the discussion in Hertslet, See Hrinsilyr, supra
note 186, at 9. It hardly seems coincidence that the cases mentioned, its which liability was
firmly denied, issued from the Exchequer.
262 Thiestley, 3 Murph. & H. at 307. Thus, "lwlith this sort of action we are familiar; for
every day persons bring actions against railway companies, coach proprietors and private
individuals for accidents resulting from mismanagement or negligence of their servants."
Armszoorth. 11 Jur, at 760.
263 Sec supra notes 204-208 and accompanying text.
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1848 a jurist who carried great influence in delineating the bounda-
ries of employers' vicarious liability harboured no doubt as to the vi-
ability of a worker recovering at common law against his master for
injuries received from a fellow servant.
Finally, Kostal's analysis implicitly raises the traditionally held in-
terpretation of Priestley as establishing the doctrine of common cm-
ployment. 264 The basis of this widely held wisdom lies in the plethora
of examples employed by Lord Abinger in delineating the "absurdity"
of allowing recovery. 265
 Abinger, C.B.'s hypotheticals certainly con-
templated suits by servants against their masters for the negligence of
their fellow employees based on a theory of vicarious liability, and
thus inspired later appellate judges in creating the common-law de-
fences of common employment and volenti. Yet, no matter what liabil-
ity nightmare had haunted the Chief Baron, the actual ruling of the
case went only to a master's direct. liability to his servant for his own
negligence. In addition, the plaintiff never once asserted that anyone
other than Fowler caused his injuries. In point of fact, the identity (or
even existence, for it is possible that Charles Priestley did so himself)
of the individuals who loaded the wagon was never presented in evi-
dence.
CONCLUSION
This Article has demonstrated how Priestley v. Fowler is best under-
stood within the framework of the emerging independent tort of neg-
ligence as a failed effort to extend master/servant liability, rather
than as establishing the doctrine of common employment, In so do-
ing, it illustrated that Hutchinson v. York was the true source of the de-
fence, and that this was the standard contemporary estimation. The
Article also described how, incrementally, Priestley came to be incor-
264 Because Priestley can only be unreliable in failing to preclude vicarious liability
Armsworth if it created the defence of common employment. See MICHAEL LonPAN, THE
COMMON LAW AND ENGLISH JURISPRUDENCE 1760-1850, at 285-86 (1991).
265 Warning that in the future masters would be
liable to the servant, for the negligence of the chambermaid, in putting him
into a damp bed, for that of the upholsterer for sending in a crazy bedstead,
whereby the servant was made to fall down, while asleep, and injure himself for
the negligence of the cook in not properly cleansing the copper vessels used in
the kitchen; of the butcher in supplying the family with meat of a quality injuri-
ous to health; of the builder for a defect in the foundation of the house,
whereby it fell and injured both the master and servant in ruins.
Thies/icy, 3 Murph. & H. at 308.
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reedy understood as originating common employment. Lastly, the
general inaccuracy of other interpretations was demonstrated. Ac-
cordingly, if Priestley was "the notorious father of an infamous line of
precedems,"266 the progeny were illegitimate.
468 LOBBAN, supra note 269, at 285-86.
